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Family Law
BY LOUISE GRAHAM
his Article addresses some of the family law developments
occurring since the Kentucky Law Journal last published a
Kentucky law survey.' Space limitations preclude discussion of
every post-1985 change. Instead, this Article focuses on general trends,
significant cases, and legislative developments.
Inquiry into family law developments in Kentucky is timely, not only
because of the social importance of family relations, but also because of
other contemporaneous efforts at family law reform. The American Law
Institute ("ALl") is currently considering a final draft of principles
governing family dissolution.? That draft, andthe discussions that surround
its ultimate acceptance or rejection by the ALI, undoubtedly will be the'
focus of national concern. Kentucky courts, the General Assembly, and
Kentucky lawyers will need to determine to what extent the Restatement's
positions should prompt changes in this state's law.
Emerging controversies have marked other areas of family law.
Grandparent visitation and third-party custody rights may overlap as more
child custody cases involve intergenerational disputes between parents and
grandparents? Rights of unwed fathers also have figured prominently in
custody-related decisions.4 Finally, Kentucky courts have addressed
* Wendell H. Ford Professor of Law. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1977, University of Texas.
'See Louise Everett Graham, Domestic Relations, 73 KY. L.J. 379 (1984-85).
2 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DIsSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final Draft Part I,
Feb. 14, 1997). The draft version of the American Law Institute ("ALI") statement
contains the warning that the draft, although tentatively approved by the ALI at
1995 and 1996 meetings, does not represent the ALI's final position on any issue
dealt with in the draft. Nevertheless, the document does highlight those issues that
are the subject of discussion, and also provides illustrations of the positions that
may be taken on those issues. Part I of the final draft covers distribution of property
at divorce and compensatory payments between spouses.
3 See infra text accompanying notes 165-82.
4 Forexample, unmarried fathers have been granted joint custody and have also
claimed the right to have the minor child bear the paternal surname. See Hazel v.
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international custody disputes, a new trend that involves interpretation of
federal law.'
Child support enforcement continues to raise numerous issues. The
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act6 became effective January 1, 1998.'
Interpretation of the Act will affect this state's ability to serve as a forum
for child support disputes as well as this state's duty to enforce child
support orders from other states.
Other developments involving the family center on the parent-child
relationship rather than marriage dissolution. New concerns about the right
of children to permanent, safe homes may alter state practice regarding
termination of parental rights.8
I. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY AT MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION
A. Characterization and Distribution of Property at Divorce
As family law practitioners know, Kentucky's version of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act requires characterization of property as marital
or nonmarital before any equitable distribution of property at divorce.9
Wells, 918 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996); see also Greathouse v. Shreve, 891
S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1995).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 134-44.
6 UNIF. INTERSTATE FAM. SUPPORT ACT (amended 1996), 9 U.L.A. 278 (Supp.
1997).
7 The Legislative Research Commission's notes to the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act as adopted in Kentucky provide that the statute becomes
effective on the date required by Congress. See 1996 Ky. Acts, ch. 365, see. 65.
Congress mandated that states adopt the Act not later than January 1, 1998. See 42
U.S.C. § 666(f) (1996).
8See infra text accompanying notes 276-80.
9 The General Assembly adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in
1972. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. [hereinafterK.R.S.] § 403.190 (Michie 1996). The
Uniform Act's initial draft provided for both marital and nonmarital property. See
LOUISE E. GRAHAM & HON. JAMES E. KELLER, 15 KENTUCKY PRACTICE:
DOMESTICRELATIONS LAW 502 (2d ed. 1997). Currently, the Uniform Act permits
states to choose one of two alternative schemes for disposing of property at
divorce. Alternative B permits division of marital, but not nonmarital, property. See
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, Alt. B, 9A U.L.A. 239-40 (1979).
Kentucky's statute is similar to Alternative B, although section 403.190(2)(e)
contains additional language not part of the Uniform Act. Models of property
division that require characterization of property as marital or nonmarital are also
796" [VOL. 86
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Section 403.190(2) governs the characterization of property.'" In its 1996
session, the General Assembly amended the portion of this statute dealing
with property acquired by gift or inheritance." Before the amendment, the
statute directed courts to characterize as nonmarital property any property
acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent, even though the property was
acquired during the marriage. 2 The amendment now requires that courts
also characterize as nonmarital property any income from donated or
inherited property or the appreciated value of that property, unless one of
the spouse's efforts substantially contributed either to the production of
income or to the appreciation in value.3
Kentucky's historical rule for characterizing income from nonmarital
property as marital property arose in a case grounded in statutory interpre-
tation, but lacking discussion of policy choices. In Brunson v. Brunson,1
4
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that the legislature's failure to
mention income in section 403.190(2)(e), and that statute's reference to
"increase in value," indicated that the income from nonmarital property
was to be treated as marital property.15 The court's rule rested on the
common principle of statutory interpretation that the inclusion of one thing
implies the exclusion of others. It also drew from the commentary to the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which referred to the Spanish rule
treating income from nonmarital property as marital.'
6
common in other states. See infra note 33.
" The Kentucky Supreme Court has long held that characterization ofproperty
mustprecede equitable division. SeeHollonv. Hollon, 623 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. 1981).
"See K.R.S. § 403.190(2)(a).
For holdings that property received by gift or inheritance is the nonmarital
property of the donee, see Farmer v. Farmer, 506 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1974); Angel
v. Angel, 562 S.W.2d 661 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Culver v. Culver, 572 S.W.2d 617
(Ky. Ct. App. 1978). A property transfer will not be treated as a gift if the transfer
is not gratuitous. See Underwood v. Underwood, 836 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that father's agreement to forgive debt incurred through transfer of
insurance agency to son in exchange for son's promise to give father future
employment made the transfer one supported by consideration).
13 See K.R.S. § 403.190(2)(a).
14 Brunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). Other cases
holding that the income from nonmarital property is marital are Dotson v. Dotson,
864 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1993), Mercer v. Mercer, 836 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1992), and
Lampton v. Lampton, 721 S.W.2d 736 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
" See Brunson, 569 S.W.2d at 178.
16 See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 239-40 (1979).
One might argue that the Spanish rule has the advantage of treating earnings from
1997-98]
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Kentucky courts treat passive appreciation as nonmarital,7 but usually
treat income from nonmarital property as marital."8 Distinguishing income
from appreciation was not always as simple as it might seem. In Mercer v.
Mercer,9 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the increase in value of
a certificate of deposit was income and therefore marital property. The
certificate of deposit earned interest. That interest was added to the
certificate's original face value. The court relied on the tax treatment of
interest as income in making its decision.2"
The Mercer opinion caused concern. The interest was income in the
technical sense, but neither party expended any effort to produce that
income. Thus, some found it difficult to distinguish the Mercer certificate
of deposit from a share of stock, for which for the increase in value would
have been treated as nonmarital had the stock been held in the same manner
as the Mercer certificate.21 Dissenters in Mercer argued that the type of
investment should not control characterization at divorce. That argument
carried the General Assembly.
The amendment nevertheless leaves some questions unanswered.
Placing the amendment in section 403.190(2)(a) creates aproperty division
capital the same as earnings from labor. That is, if one of the spouses earned
property through his or her labor during the marriage, the property would be treated
as marital. Similarly, if one of the spouses had an asset that earned income during
the marriage, the Spanish rule would treat that income as marital property.
'7See Daniels v. Daniels, 726 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
1 Occasionally the results seemed to be the product of tortured rationales. In
Sousley v. Sousley, 614 S.W.2d 942 (Ky. 1981), the Supreme Court of Kentucky
held that the income produced when an entrepreneur husband sold a premarital
business was marital income. The court might have reached the same result by
finding that the husband's significant efforts probably were responsible for the gain
in business value, whether that gain was labeled income or appreciation. Cf
Vanover-May v. Marsh, 793 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (treating the income
from the sale of a nonmarital home as nonmarital without mentioning the Sousley
rule). The Sousley rule was sometimes applied over vigorous dissent. See Walters
v. Walters, 782 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1989) (Leibson, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
corporation's distribution of assets to the husband should not be treated as income
to husband). One aspect of Sousley may survive for reexamination in the newly
amended statute. If a spouse has special expertise that is causally related to the
increased gain in value, he or she may have made the significant efforts needed to
transform the gain, or some part of it, to marital property. See the cases cited infra
note 32.
9 Mercer v. Mercer, 836 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1992).20 See id. at 899.
21 But see infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
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statute that mentions increase in value of nonmarital property twice, once
in section 403.190(2)(a), where the newly amended rule refers to an
exclusion of donated or inherited property, and again in section
403.190(2)(e), which addresses the increased value of premarital property.
In the latter subsection, (2)(e), there is no mention of income from
property.? Instead, the section refers only to the increase in value of
property acquired before the marriage, treating that property as nonmarital
if the increase in value does not result from the parties' efforts. 3 Future
litigation may be necessary to determine whether Kentucky courts will
apply a single rule that distinguishes only between active and passive
increase or whether they will read the marital property statute to contain
two different rules, one for gifted or inherited property and one for
premarital property.
Courts must also reconcile other possible differences in the two
statutory sections. Unlike section 403.190(2)(e), which implicates a"source
of the funds" rule by providing that the increase in value is nonmarital to
the extent that it is not the result of marital effort,24 section 403.190(2)(a)
2 This factwas noted by the court inBrunson v. Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978).
1 Although the statutory section specifically refers to property acquired before
the marriage, Kentucky courts have applied the rule to apportion value increases
when the property was acquired through inheritance during the marriage. See
Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1980).
24 See Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). The
Brandenburg rule has been applied to require apportionment of the increase in
value when property subject to a mortgage experiences equity gains during the
marriage. See generally Louise Everett Graham, Using Formulas to Separate
Marital and Nonmarital Property: A Policy Oriented Approach to the Division of
AppreciatedProperty Upon Divorce, 73 KY. L.J. 41 (1984-85). For criticism ofthe
rule, see John W. Potter & Ellen B. Ewing, Apportioning Marital andNon-marital
Interests in a SingleAsset, 9 KY. BENCH &B. 14 (Apr. 1983). When property is not
subject to amortization formulas based on mortgage interest tables, no single
formula for apportionment exists. California courts have used two approaches. In
one line of cases, California courts have focused on the value of a spouse's efforts
expended to improve nonmarital property. See Van Camp v. Van Camp, 199 P. 885
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921). If a spouse has not been compensated adequately for
services rendered during the marriage, the marital partnership has a claim against
the nonmarital property for the value of the services. Of course, if a spouse has
been adequately compensated and the marital community has consumed that
income, no claim against the nonmarital estate survives. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665
S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984); see also In re Marriage of Werries, 616 N.E.2d 1379 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993); Huger v. Huger, 433 S.E.2d 255 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). Another
1997-98]
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states that increase in value remains nonmarital unless there are significant
marital efforts. The latter section contains no command for a rule of
proportionality and, indeed, no command for any recognition ofnonmarital
interests. Courts will have to decide whether to permit tracing of
nonmarital contributions under the rule of section 403.190(2)(a), or
whether the rule converts nonmarital property entirely into marital
property.2
5
Somewhat ironically, the amendment grants continuing importance to
the distinction between active and passive assets.26 Under the old version
of section 403.190(2), the owner of a certificate of deposit or of a dividend-
producing stock would find himself or herself with divisible marital
property because the certificate's interest27 and the stock dividends' were
income. On the other hand, stock shares that appreciated in value would not
produce divisible marital property.29 The result in either case depended on
the particular asset owned; for example, on whether a stock produced
growth or dividends. If Kentucky courts follow one pattern adopted
approach stems from Pereira v. Pereira, 103 P. 488 (Cal. 1909). In that case, the
California court held that the nonmarital property owner is entitled to a reasonable
rate of return on his or her separate capital. Pereira itself treated the legal rate of
interest as a reasonable return. See id. at 491.
' Even before the source-of-the-funds rule developed, Kentucky courts
consistently permitted a spouse to recover nonmarital assets brought into the
marriage. See Farmer v. Farmer, 506 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1974); Angel v. Angel, 562
S.W.2d 661 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Turley v. Turley, 562 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978). Missouri courts apply a rule of proportionality. The property becomes
marital to the extent that marital labor or assets are used to increase value. See
Meservey v. Meservey, 841 S.W.2d 240,245 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Virginia courts
have applied a rule treating the entire increase in value as marital if one spouse
proves a significant contribution and the other spouse fails to demonstrate that
other factors affected the increase in value. See Martin v. Martin, 489 S.E.2d 727
(Va. Ct. App. 1997).
26 The irony stems from the argument made in Mercer v. Mercer, 836 S.W.2d
897 (Ky. 1992), that the type of asset held should not determine the outcome ofthe
case. New York courts have distinguished between passive assets, such as
unimproved real estate and mutual funds, and active assets. See Greenwald v.
Greenwald, 565 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (treating stocks as active
assets). But see Kirshenbaum v. Kirshenbaum, 611 N.Y.S.2d 228 (N.Y. App. Div.
1994) (treating the husband's Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") as an
active asset).27 See Mercer, 836 S.W.2d at 897.
28See Lampton v. Lampton, 721 S.W.2d 736 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
29See Daniels v. Daniels, 726 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
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elsewhere, they will treat some investments as presumptively passive,
while others will be labeled as necessarily active. 0 Even if courts following
this method draw careful conclusions, the nature of the asset will be
important. For example, an estate beneficiary who inherited a business
would be in a different position from an individual who inherited a stock
portfolio, particularly if that portfolio were managed by others. Thus, the
end result of any case would depend on the type of assets involved.
Owners of inherited businesses may lose the exclusion provided by
section 403.190(2)(a) unless they put little or no effort into the business.
Although section 403.190(2)(a) makes both the appreciation of and the
income from the business nonmarital, that exclusion is lost if one of the
marriage partners engages in significant activities that contribute to the
increased value or income. Courts must first determine whether the
particular spousal efforts at issue contributed significantly to the gain in
value.31 The relationship among significant efforts, ownership, and control
will be defined by future litigation. In other states, spouses who held
corporate offices or management positions in inherited businesses have
argued that their efforts were not sufficient to impress the business with a
marital character.32
3
1 See Greenwald, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
31 The formula for allocating the increase in value between the marital and
nonmarital estates set out in Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1981), does not take into account indirect contributions to the increase in
value. New York courts have found that indirect contributions by homemaker'
spouses may result in increased value, although the rule is generally limited to
cases involving assets that have appreciated through the significant activity of the
property owner spouse. See Feldman v. Feldman, 605 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (stating that husband's periodic visits to inherited real property to check
on tenant were not related to increase in value of property, and refusing to
recognize wife's indirect contribution). Tennessee courts appear to require each
spouse to make significant contributions. See Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823
(Tenn. 1996) (discussing indirect homemaker contributions, but factually
demonstrating that each party had contributed directly to the reduction of the
mortgage on nonmarital property).
32 See, e.g., Oxley v. Oxley, 695 So.2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (corporate
president-husband argued that he delegated all management authority to others and
made no substantial contribuition to business appreciation); Pagano v. Pagano, 665
So.2d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (husband claimed that his salary was solely
due to his relationship to the business owner, his father, and not to his own efforts
in business); Robbie v. Robbie, 654 So.2d 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (general
manager of Miami Dolphins claimed that he held position in name only and made
1997-98]
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Excluding donated or inherited property from the marital property
definition and, therefore, from equitable distribution at divorce, is a
common practice in other states that treat marriage as a partnership and
provide for equitable distribution of marital property.33 Theoretically,
donated or gifted property's exclusion from distribution at divorce does not
denigrate the marital partnership concept because the fruits of marital effort
remain available for division between the parties.34 The marital partnership
no significant contribution to team value); Rowe v. Rowe, 480 S.E.2d 760 (Va. Ct.
App. 1997) (husband showed that part of increase in value of newspaper stock was
due to increased circulation of the newspaper, stemming from population growth,
and also to efforts of his brother, who also worked for the newspaper); Spindler v.
Spindler, 558 N.W.2d 645 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (marital improvements to inherited
lake cottage did not increase value where most of value was attributable to
location). Cf Spencer v. Spencer, 646 N.Y.S.2d 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(husband used expertise to increase value of investment account); Wade v. Wade,
897 S.W.2d 702 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (wife's use of her experience gained at
brokerage firm to manage stocks during marriage made appreciation marital);
Martin v. Martin, 489 S.E.2d 727 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (wife's acumen allowed the
parties to purchase real property at below market value and created marital interest,
although home was purchased with separate funds); Smith v. Smith, 475 S.E.2d
881 (W. Va. 1996) (treating some part of increased value of business as marital
where husband played significant role in the business, although he argued that his
withdrawals exceeded his contributions).
33 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315(a)(1)(A) (Michie 1993); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-113(1) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(1), (5)(a), (5)(b) (West
1997); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 503(a)(2) (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19-A, § 953(1), (2) (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58(1) (West 1998); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 452.330(1) (West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.34-23(10) (West
1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a) (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-121 (1996).
All but eleven states apparently limit equitable distribution to marital property. See
generally Linda D. Elrod & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, 27
FAM. L.Q. 515, 695 (1994). Some states, including Arkansas and Minnesota,
permit distribution of nonmarital property under limited circumstances. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-12-315(2) (providing that court may allocate separate property but
must state rationale on the record); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58(2) (1998)
(providing that if the court finds that property distribution and earning capacity are
not sufficient to prevent unfair hardship to one spouse, it may distribute up to one-
half of otherwise excluded property).
3 Kentucky courts have generally made a distinction between "passive"
increase in value attributable to market forces and "active' increase in value
attributable to party efforts. Only the latterbecomes divisible marital property if the
underlying asset was nonmarital property. See Goderwis v. Goderwis, 780 S.W.2d
39 (Ky. 1989); Marcum v. Marcum, 779 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1989).
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shares in all of the assets acquired by either party's effort during the
marriage.35 Only assets not the product of spousal effort during the
marriage remain solely the property of the individual owner. That vision of
marital partnership emphasizes the marital relationship's enterprise
nature 3 6 in preference to treatment of marriage as a status with accompany-
ing entitlements to property. 7 Windfall ownership, not the product of either
spouse's effort, remains with the individual spouse.
Keeping inherited or donated property out of the divisible marital pot
may seem fair for several reasons. First, widespread application of the rule
indicates a general perception of fairness.38 Second, recognition of the
nonmarital nature of inherited or donated property might accord with both
11 Section 403.190(2) defines marital property as "all property acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage." Further, although other statutory
sections speak of"efforts of the parties during the marriage," Kentucky courts have
treated the increase in value of premarital property as marital even when only one
spouse contributed directly to the increase in value. See Goderwis, 780 S.W.2d at
39. The husband in Goderwis worked in the business, but the wife did not. The
supreme court treated the increase as marital.
36 See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 920 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing
that marital property might confer investment opportunities that would be lost by
an immediate division of assets).
3' Despite judicial statements to the contrary, see, e.g., Turley v. Turley, 562
S.W.2d 665 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (Vance, J., dissenting) (remarking that marriage
is not a "business"), the treatment of marriage as an enterprise is evidenced by the
focus on work or effort as the defining characteristic of marital property. Although
the marital property statute's language refers to property "acquired" during the
marriage and not solely to spouses' work or effort, the definition of marital
property, when read as a whole, treats property attributable to work or effort during
the marriage as marital. See K.R.S. § 403.190. This enterprise metaphor is further
strengthened by statutory sections providing the basis for equitable distribution.
Courts may consider other factors, but one important factor is each party's
contribution to the acquisition of marital property. See id. § 403.190(1)(a). Work
as a homemaker is treated as a "contribution" under the statute, but there is no
requirement that it be counted as presumptively equal to efforts outside the home.
For an argument that housework is consistently undervalued by divorce courts, see
Katherine Silbaugh, TurningLaborInto Love: Houseworkand the Law, 91 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1, 59-63 (1996).
38 See supra note 33. Some state statutes do not specifically except inherited
property from division but have nonetheless been so interpreted by courts. See
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160(4) (Michie 1996) (permitting a divorce court to divide
all property acquired during the marriage). InLewis v. Lewis, 785 P.2d 550 (Alaska
1990), the court interpreted the statute to bar the division of inherited property.
1997-981
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public and individual expectations. 9 Moreover, treating gifted and
inherited property as the nonmarital property of an individual spouse
accords status to the intention of the asset donor or testator.40
The new statutory amendment applies not only to inherited or donated
property, but also to any passive increase in value of that property as well
as income derived from the property.4' Like Kentucky,42 many states treat
a passive increase in the value of nonmarital property as nonmarital,43 but
there is no general consensus regarding the treatment of income from
nonmarital property. Some community property states treat income from
nonmarital property as nonmarital, while others treat income as mar-
ital.
4
One aspect of amended section 403.190(2)(a) requires courts to treat
all gains on nonnarital property in the same way, whether those gains
would otherwise be classified as income or appreciation. Unitary treatment
of income and appreciation may make sense not only because courts have
31 Commentators have differed over party expectations regarding property to
be distributed at divorce. Some writers have noted that spouses' expectations with
regard to inherited property are not the same as those for property earned during
the marriage. See, e.g., Robert J. Levy,An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues,
23FAM.L.Q. 147, 151-56 (1989). Other commentators have apparently disagreed,
emphasizing that marriage inherently involves sharing. See, e.g., SusanWesterberg
Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future ofMarital Property Law, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1977).
40 Donor intent often controls the identity of the donee and whether the asset is
a gift. See Calloway v. Calloway, 832 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (wife's
mother gave the family a race car, which was treated as marital property because
it was intended by the donor for family recreational use); O'Neill v. O'Neill, 600
S.W.2d 493 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (ring given to wife by husband was marital
property in part because of the donor-husband's intent).
41 See K.R.S. § 403.190(2)(a).
42 See Goderwis v. Goderwis, 780 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1989); Marcum v. Marcum,
779 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1989).
4 See, e.g., Oxley v. Oxley, 695 So.2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997);
Meservey v. Meservey, 841 S.W.2d 240 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Rowe v. Rowe, 480
S.E.2d 760 (Va. Ct. App. 1997); Smith v. Smith, 475 S.E.2d 881 (W. Va. 1996).
44 Commentators have noted that most community property states follow the
American rule, under which the income from nonmarital property remains
nonmarital. However, Texas follows the Spanish rule, treating the income from
nonmarital property as marital. See generally Thomas R. Andrews, Income From
Separate Property: Towards a Theoretical Foundation, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 171 (1993).
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difficulty telling the difference between the two, but because property
owners could otherwise manipulate characterization.45
The question will then remain whether the same rationale that permits
the exclusion of inherited or donated property from the marital estate
applies to gains from inherited or donated property, if those gains are not
the result of significant spousal effort. A primary rationale for permitting
both inherited and donated property to remain with the beneficiary ordonee
has been the preservation of family estates.46 The value of preserving
family property has strong roots in Kentucky, but there is reason to exercise
caution before embracing preservation of private inheritance as the most
significant value to be considered.
Preserving family property as the nonmarital property of an inheriting
spouse necessarily has consequences for two families. One is the
beneficiary's family of origin, the family into which he or she was born,
but the other is the new family begun with the marriage. Preserving all of
the gain from nonmarital property for the beneficiary or donee could, over
a long period of time, impoverish the opportunities for the marriage-based
family at the expense of keeping property in the family of birth.47
Another rationale supportingthe Kentucky statutory amendment might
be found in arguments for court efficiency. Complex tracing,48 use of
expert witnesses for valuation, and hearings that take substantial court time
45 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, § 4.04, cmt. a.
' See William A. Reppy, Jr., Acquisition With a Mix of Community and
Separate Funds: Displacing California's Presumption of Gift By Recognizing
Shared Ownership or a Right of Reimbursement, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 965 (1995)
(suggesting preservation as the historical rationale).
47 The ALI proposes to balance the rule that all passive gain from nonmarital
property remains nonmarital with rules that recharacterize nonmarital property as
marital property if the marriage is of significant duration, see THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, supra note 2, § 4.18(1), and the asset is held for a significant period of
time, see id. § 4.18(2). However, a spouse may avoid the application of the
recharacterization rules by giving written notice to the other spouse of his or her
intention to preserve the nonmarital nature of the property. See id. § 4.18(4). A will
or gift deed that states that the bequest or gift is not subject to the recharacterization
rule must be given effect. See id. § 4.18(5).
48 The Kentucky Supreme Court's opinion in Chenaultv. Chenault, 799 S.W.2d
575 (Ky. 1990), does not necessarily foreshadow the demise of tracing
requirements imposed by section 403.190(3) and earlier cases such as Brunson v.
Brunson, 569 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). The Chenault opinion held only
that one spouse's testimony would satisfy tracing requirements ifno other evidence
implicated alternative sources for the property.
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and involve considerable expense to the parties often attend the segregation
of marital and nonmarital property. A rule that avoids such disputes and
makes the outcome of any given case more predictable could have a
significant impact on court efficiency.
Evaluating the impact of the statutory amendment on Kentucky
families at this early stage is a difficult task. Parties with inherited wealth
in the form of passive assets will be able to claim more nonmarital and,
therefore, nondivisible property. Inherited wealth increased through active
efforts of either spouse will be subject to equitable distribution. Viewed
from this perspective, the rule appears to affect a relatively small group of
litigants. In the future, the General Assembly must determine whether
incremental increases in efficiency and the protection of inherited property
justify a rule that decreases the assets available to the marital partnership,
particularly in long-term marriages.
B. The Role ofPrivate Agreement in Determining Divisibility ofProperty
During the last ten years, the Supreme Court of Kentucky has
determined that otherwise valid antenuptial agreements may affect both
property division at divorce and the availability of post-dissolution
support.49 Because both antenuptial agreements and separation agreements
under section 403.180 may affect property distribution or post-dissolution
support at divorce, the standard for determining the enforceability of those
agreements is important."0 In Shraberg v. Shraberg,s' the Supreme Court
of Kentucky upheld a trial court's finding that a separation agreement was
manifestly unfair and, consequently, not enforceable. The court held that
unconscionability, as a defense to the enforcement of separation agree-
ments, did not require that a trial court find fraud, duress, undue influence,
or overreaching. Instead, unconscionability required only a finding that the
agreement was manifestly unfair, after consideration of the parties'
economic circumstances and other relevant evidence.52 The supreme court
49 See Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990); Edwardsonv. Edwardson,
798 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1990).
" Although antenuptial agreements are not covered under section 403.180, the
unconscionability standard developed under that statute may also affect the
definition of unconscionability applied to antenuptial agreements.
s Shraberg v. Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d 330 (Ky. 1997).
52See id. at 332-33. The supreme court opinion did not particularize the other
relevant evidence. The Shraberg husband was not represented by counsel, but that
omission has never before been the ground for determining that an agreement was
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made clear that the most important factor in Shrabergwas the relationship
between the husband's gross income and his financial obligations under the
agreement. The court noted that the husband had agreed to pay his former
wife, to whom he had been married for some seventeen years, more than
$160,000 annually from his pre-tax income of approximately $200,000.
Some of the total amount was payable as maintenance; other portions
provided child support for the five minor children of the marriage.53
Shraberg could signal a departure from earlier appellate attitudes toward
unconscionable. See Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1990) (stating that
there is no requirement for each party to be represented by counsel).
The court in Shrabergjustified its review of the contract for unconscionability
on the ground that a "strong and persistent spouse [could] overwhelm the other
spouse," but it made no reference to Mrs. Shraberg as a person who exhibited those
characteristics. Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d at 333. The court also spoke of spouses who
labored under "great mental distress" and pointed out that protective rules, formerly
applicable only to a wife, were applicable to either spouse. Id.; see also McGowan
v. McGowan, 663 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (setting aside an agreement
requiring the husband to pay approximately one-third of his income on the ground
that he was overwhelmed by his wife in the negotiations).
13 See Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d at 331. The husband agreed to provide some
$8000 per month in child support, to be reduced by $1000 per month per child as
each child graduated from high school. However, the agreement permitted no
reductions below $5000 in child support. The husband also agreed to pay $5500
to his former spouse as maintenance. The maintenance would have been reduced
by $1500 per month upon the sale of the marital residence. The wife was entitled
to remain in the marital home while the husband paid the $5200 mortgage and was
also entitled to receive most of the household goods and a vehicle. See id. at 331.
Although there were arguments at the trial court level over the tax ramifications of
the award, the supreme court did not address those issues. The child support
amounts agreed to by the husband were some $5000 greater than the highest
amount of support available for five children under the Kentucky child support
guidelines, see K.R.S. § 403.212, but the husband's gross income was also greater
than the highest amount specified in the guideline table, see id. Having found the
agreement not enforceable, the trial court ordered the husband to pay $3000 per
month in child support and also to provide both health and dental insurance.
However, the obligor avoided not only the payment of the higher child support
amount, but the agreement's provision that the husband would pay for post-
secondary education. See Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d at 331. The wife was awarded
graduated maintenance in decreasing amounts totaling some $132,000 payable over
a period of thirteen years. The marital residence was sold and the proceeds divided.
Apparently the husband retained his medical practice, which produced the
$200,000-per-year gross income.
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agreements dividing property and providing for post-dissolution support. 4
Earlier appellate opinions had struck down separation agreements only
when the agreement not only resulted in economic hardship, but also was
tainted by some form of misrepresentation.5  In Rupley v. Rupley,56 the wife
sought to set aside an agreement based on a determination that a corpora-
tion owned by the husband had no net asset value. The conclusion that the
corporation had no value may not have amounted to intentional fraud, but
it was clearly the product of the husband's failure to disclose relevant
financial information, a failure that the court labeled as misrepresentation."
In Burke v. Sexton,"8 the appellate court set aside a separation agreement
after the husband's actions deprived the wife of notice that the divorce,
which he claimed to have dismissed, was being pursued. Although the
agreement was also too one-sided, the primary fraud in Burke related to the
husband's intentional activity in depriving the wife of the right to challenge
the agreement.5 9 Shraberg treats the substance of the agreement as
unconscionable based on the amount the obligor agreed to provide. More
importantly, it does so in the context of a high-income obligor with a long-
term spouse and five minor children.6"
II. MAINTENANCE
Kentucky courts have not developed a consistent theory supporting the
imposition of post-dissolution support obligations. Some courts have
upheld awards to former spouses ofhighly compensated individuals as long
as the awards met the current expenses of the former spouse, without
4 Two factors limit the importance of the case. First, one reading of the case is
that the supreme court has granted significant discretion to trial courts to determine
unconscionability and will not overrule a trial court decision merely because other
persons might draw from the facts inferences other than those drawn by the trial
court. SeeShraberg, 939 S.W.2d at334 (Cooper, J., concurring). Second, two other
justices joined in Justice Cooper's concurring opinion, while Justice Stumbo
dissented from the opinion.
" Thus, hardship and misrepresentation or fraud may be separate requirements,
but both were met in the earlier cases.
56 Rupley v. Rupley, 776 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
57 See id. at 852. The court also mentioned the corporation's "curious" account-
ing practice, a clue that it viewed the valuation information as unreliable and
perhaps unfair. See id. at 851.
'8 Burke v. Sexton, 814 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).
59 See id. at 291-92.60 See Shraberg v. Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d 330, 332-33 (Ky. 1997).
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regard to the disparity in the parties' economic circumstances. 61 Other
courts have emphasized disparity in the parties' post-dissolution economic
circum-stances. 62 Appellate courts have imposed maintenance obligations
as a remedy for one spouse's contribution to the other spouse's acquisition
of a professional degree or license,' but recent opinions demonstrate that
trial courts may work equity in such a situation without awarding mainte-
nance.64 Fault continues to play some role in the amount of maintenance
awards, but only the proposed recipient's fault may concern the court.65
The ALI's proposed final draft on the Principles of the Law ofFamily
Dissolution' suggests a major shift in the theories underpinning mainte-
61 See Perrine v. Christine, 833 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1992). It was agreed that the
wife's net estate awarded in the divorce had a value over $533,000. However, it
also was agreed that the wife was unemployable at the end of a thirty-four year
marriage, which had included the responsibility of raising four children. The
husband paid no maintenance and continued his lucrative employment. The
supreme court discounted arguments that meeting the wife's needs would require
her to liquidate marital assets awarded to her. See id. at 827. The decision implies
that the disparity between the parties' post-dissolution economic circumstances is
not legally significant
62 See Beckner v. Beckner, 903 S.W.2d 528 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that
although the parties had been married for less than ten years, the husband, an
attorney, would enjoy a higher standard of living than the wife, who had not yet
finished her education and could not maintain herself at the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage).
63See Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1985).
"See Schmitz v. Schmitz, 801 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
6 SeeTennerv. Tenner, 906 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1995). The Tenner court applied
the rule counting the proposed recipient's fault (in the case before the court,
adultery) to a factual pattern involving a proposed recipient whose multiple-
personality disorder did not render her legally irresponsible, but may have been
connected to her behavior. The ALI proposed restatement would not permit courts
to consider marital misconduct in determining maintenance awards. See THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, § 5.02(2). However, the restatement does
not foreclose one spouse from suing the other in tort. See id. § 29. Kentucky courts
have not generally been receptive to suits between spouses based on the tort of
outrage. See Whittington v. Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that neither dissipation of assets nor adultery constitutes outrageous
conduct). Also, Kentucky apparently bars suits for intentional infliction of
emotional distress if the injured party could have sued for assault or battery. See
Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).
66 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, §§ 5.02-5.06 (principles
governing compensation).
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nance awards. Section 5.02 of the proposed final draft states that its
primary objective is the identification of appropriate compensable losses
arising from marriage dissolution. The section abandons standards related
to contract, contribution, and spousal need. The published draft states that
need does not provide a coherent standard for requiring post-dissolution
payments,67 and also finds fault with theories of contribution and contract.68
The proposed restatement replaces the need standard, as well as the labels
"alimony" and "maintenance," with the terminology "compensatory
payments." 69 Compensable losses under the proposed restatement are
limited to financial losses arising from the dissolution of marriage."
Section 5.03(2) permits compensatory awards under three circumstances:
(1) an award compensating for the loss of living standard experienced at
dissolution by the spouse with less wealth or earning capacity when a
marriage of significant duration is terminated;7' (2) an award compensating
for the continuing loss of earning capacity arising during the marriage
because of one spouse's disproportionate share of child care;72 and (3) a
similar award for lost earning capacity incurred during the marriage and
continuing after its dissolution where the loss is traceable to care for a sick,
elderly, or disabled third party for whom the other spouse or both spouses
jointly are morally responsible. 3
Other financial losses are compensable under section 5.03(3). This
section permits compensation for losses incurred by either spouse when the
marriage is dissolved before that spouse realizes a fair return on his or her
67 See id. § 5.02, cmt. a; see also Russell v. Russell, 878 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1994) (wife's inability to support herself cited as a factor in the maintenance
award); Robbins v. Robbins, 849 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (similar
rationale applied to wife who was a minimum-wage earner); Garrett v. Garrett, 766
S.W.2d 634 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (statute requires court to balance the needs ofboth
spouses). Cf K.R.S. § 403.200(1)(a).68 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, § 5.05, cmt. b.
69 Id. § 5.02, cmt. a. The drafters noted that recharacterizing the payments as
compensatory amounts removes the stigma of a "plea for help" and grants the
claimant an "entitlement." Id.
7
1 See id. § 5.02, cmt. b, c; see also id. § 5.03(1) ("Compensatory awards should
allocate equitably between the spouses certain financial losses that either or both
incur and which are realized at dissolution when the family is divided into separate
economic units.").
71 See id. § 5.03(2)(a); see also id. § 5.05 (describing the award's calculation).
72 See id. § 5.03(2)(b); see also id. § 5.06. The child care may involve marital
children or children of either spouse.
' See id. § 5.03(2)(c).
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investment in the other spouse's earning capacity.74 It also allows
compensation if there is an unfairly disproportionate disparity between the
spouses in their respective abilities to recover the premarital standard of
living after the dissolution of a short marriage.7' The draft restatement
permits spouses to qualify for more than one kind of compensatory award,
but places significant limits on aggregate awards. Under section 5.03(4)(b),
no award pursuant to section 5.03(3) is available to an individual who
receives a substantial award under section 5.03(2).76 Moreover, section
5.03(4)(a) provides that no award under section 5.03(2) can exceed a
maximum award available under a formula set out in section 5.05. Section
5.05 thus lies at the heart of the suggested rationale for compensatory
awards because it establishes a formula for computing maintenance awards.
The proposed method for setting maintenance awards involves the adoption
of statewide rules for implementing the section's formula. A state must first
adopt a rule governing the income disparity and the marriage duration
needed to trigger the formula's application.77 The proposed restatement
leaves to the states the rules to be adopted;78 however, the illustrations to
the section employ an income disparity of twenty-five percent. The
durational factor is more complex.79 A state must determine the minimum
number ofyears ofmarriage neededto qualify under statutes implementing
the principles of section 5.05.80 Presumptively, some marriages will not
74See id. § 5.03(3)(a). Cf Lovett v. Lovett, 688 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1985); Clark
v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990).
75See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, § 503(3)(b). Cf Carter v.
Carter, 656 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
76 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, § 503(4)(b); see also id.
§§ 5.15, 5.16.
77 See id. § 5.05(2); see also id. § 5.05, cmt. d. Similar rules apply to awards
compensating for a primary caretaker's residual loss of earning capacity under
section 5.06. See id. § 5.05, cmt. e.
7 See id. However, comment d notes that the policies underlying the adoption
of the statewide formula would not permit a state to adopt rules that would allow
a spouse to avoid a maintenance obligation in a marriage often years duration with
an income disparity of twenty-five percent. The policies governing the section are
explained in comment c. Comment c recognizes that dependent spouses in a long-
term marriage experience an economic risk at marriage dissolution that is different
from that of their marriage partners.
79 See id. § 5.05(3).
" See id § 5.05, cmt. d. Although the rule is left to the states, the comments
suggest that a rule permitting application of the formula to a four-year marriage
would be inappropriate, as would exclusion of a ten-year marriage.
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qualify for the application of section 5.05 because they are too short. The
formula, as illustrated by the restatement, then requires the court to
multiply the number of years the parties have been married by the
durational factor.8 1 The durational factor used in the illustration is .01, but
in no case may it exceed .4.82 As a result, the maximum award level is
achieved if the parties have been married forty years.
To implement the formula, which creates a presumptive award, the
court measures the disparity between the spouses' income at the time the
award is to become effective. For example, if Spouse A has an income of
$5000 per month and Spouse B has an income of $2000 per month, the
difference of $3000 satisfies the twenty-five percent disparity rule. The
court then multiplies the durational factor by the number of years that the
spouses have been married. If the spouses were married for twenty years
and the durational factors from the proposed draft illustration were used,
3
this would be 20 x .01, or .2. This durational factor is then multiplied by the
income difference, in this case $3000, which gives a presumptive award of
$600. A $600-per-month award would leave the obligor with $4400 and
give the recipient $2600 per month.
84
The section 5.05 formula creates a presumptive award unless the trial
court makes written findings of fact establishing that the formula's use
would create an unfair award. 85 In addition, a trial court could make an
award under section 5.05, even though no award would usually be made in
marriages of similar income levels and duration, if the court recited facts
demonstrating that the absence of the award would work a substantial
8" See id. § 5.05, cmt. a, illus. 1.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 On the facts of Shraberg v. Shraberg, 939 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Ky. 1997),
assuming Mrs. Shraberg had no income, she would have received approximately
$34,000 per year. The formula would have been the number of years of marriage
(17) x durational factor (.01) x income difference ($200,000) = $34,000. She might
also have been entitled to an award under section 5.06 based on her
disproportionate responsibility for child care and loss of earning capacity, but that
award could not exceed the maximum value allowed for a section 5.05 award
alone. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, § 5.06, cmt. e, illus. 5.
Thus the total award to Mrs. Shraberg under both sections 5.05 and 5.06 could not
have been greaterthan $80,000, since thatwould the maximum section 5.05 award,
assuming that the maximum durational factor was .4.
85 See id. § 5.05(4). Cf K.R.S. § 403.211(2) (providing that child support
guidelines establish presumptive amounts of child support unless court makes
written findings of fact).
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injustice. 86 The proposed restatement's principles will be debated both
nationally and in Kentucky. On the one hand, the restatement principles
could provide certainty and, according to the drafters, compensation only
for measurable financial losses incurred because of the marriage. Others,
however, may find the attempts to limit responsibility for a former spouse,
particularly in long-term marriages, objectionable. 7
III. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION
Kentucky courts have avoided conflict between this state's courts and
courts of sister states in child custody matters by interpreting both the
Parental Kidnapping Act of 1980 ("PKPA") 8 and the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA") 89 to limit Kentucky's custody
" See K.R.S. § 403.211(2); THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 2, §
5.05(4).
17 The restatement drafters rejected a large body of literature arguing that long-
term homemakers are entitled to share in the post-dissolution income of their
spouses, although the drafters claim to have reached results similar to those
suggested in this literature. See id. § 5.05, cmt. c. For arguments that dependent
spouses should be entitled to share in the income of a former spouse, see June
Carbone, Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of Community, 31
Hous. L. REV. 359 (1994); Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law
and the Romance ofEconomics, 36 WM. &MARYL.REV. 989 (1994-95); Joan M.
Krauskopf, Comments on Income Sharing: Redefining the Family in Terms of
Community, 31 HOUs. L. REV. 417 (1994); Jane Rutheford, Duty in Divorce:
Shared Income As a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990); Jana B.
Singer, Alimony andEfficiency: The Gendered Costs andBenefits ofthe Economic
JustificationforAlmony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423(1994); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and
the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership
Buyouts andDissociation UnderNo-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993). A recent
article discussing the proposed restatement is J. Thomas Oldham, ALIPrinciples
ofFamily Dissolution: Some Comments, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 801.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1738A; see Can v. Howard, 850 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that Kentucky courts may not modify visitation provisions of Ohio
decree); Wieczorek v. Sebastian, 751 S.W.2d 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
Kentucky emergency custody order invalid because of prior Ohio decree).
" K.R.S. § 403.420; see Wood v. Graham, 633 S.W.2d 404 (Ky. 1982)
(declining to exercise jurisdiction because child had been improperly removed from
his legal custodian); Rockwell v. Henning, 731 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987)
(declining to exercise jurisdiction when child lived entire life in Florida until eight
days before petition for modification).
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jurisdictionf 0 Appellate courts have applied rules limiting this state's
jurisdiction without distinguishing clearly between two types of cases:
those in which a Kentucky court rendered the initial decree9I and those in
which a party requests modification of a sister state decree.' This failure
to differentiate between the two types of cases and to explain clearly this
state's position on continuing jurisdiction has caused unnecessary
confusion, may have inappropriately limited the ability of trial courts to
deal with difficult custody cases, and has not given full play to the federal
PKPA 3
A recent Supreme Court of Kentucky case illustrates the court's
reluctance to confront the PKPA directly. In Brighty v. Brighty,94 the court
avoided explication of the federal Act's impact on custody jurisdiction in
this state by holding that enforcement of a Kentucky decree through the
contempt process did not depend on either the UCCJA or the federal
PKPA.95 The parents in Brighty had been divorced in Kentucky in 1985.96
In 1988, the custodial mother remarried and left Kentucky.97 In 1990, the
father sought to enforce his visitation rights in Kentucky. The Jefferson
90 There are some exceptions. See Bock v. Graves, 804 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1991);
Bruenig v. Silverman, 563 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).91 See Bryant v. Bryant, 545 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1977); Honigsberg v. Goad, 550
S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1976); Turley v. Griffin, 508 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974).
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has erroneously stated that the Parental
Kidnapping Act of 1980 ("PKPA") does not prevent a Kentucky court from
exercising subjectmatterjurisdictionto decide achild custody case. SeeKarahalios
v. Karahalios, 848 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993). The PKPA's language is
addressed to modification and enforcement, but the Act nevertheless has an impact
on initial custody litigation because it determines whether the decree rendered will
be enforceable and not subject to modification by another state. See 28 U.S.C. §
1738A(a).
92 Kentucky courts have clearly recognized the PKPA's control over this state's
ability to modify a sister state decree. See Cann v. Howard, 850 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1993). However, they have not discussed whether this state's rules, in
combination with the PKPA, prevent a sister state from modifying a Kentucky
decree. Kentucky's failure to state clear rules on continuing jurisdiction may have
led to the result in Pierce v. Pierce, 640 P.2d 899 (Mont. 1982), a case in which a
Montana court exercised jurisdiction over a child who had been wrongfully
retained in that state, modifying a prior Kentucky divorce decree.
93See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
94Brighty v. Brighty, 883 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1994).
9 See id. at 496.
96See id. at 495.
' See id.
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Circuit Court held the mother in contempt for her failure to provide
visitation, but it remanded the contempt sentence on the condition that the
mother comply with the visitation provisions of the decree. 9 In 1991, the
mother and child moved to New Jersey, where the mother apparently failed
to provide visitation.9 The noncustodial father again sought to enforce his
rights, but in the second Kentucky hearing on this issue the mother argued
that the lengthy absence of the child from the state resulted in Kentucky's
loss of jurisdiction to determine the father's visitation rights."°
The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that enforcement jurisdiction in
child custody cases was different from modificationjurisdiction. 01 It found
that the Jefferson Circuit Court retained jurisdiction to enforce its
previously entered and unmodified decree, whether or not it would have
been the appropriate forum for custody modification. 2
Although the Kentucky court's rule follows an interpretation used by
some courts in other states,0 3 it also raises both practical and theoretical
issues. As a practical matter, the Kentucky court's contempt ruling can
affect a party residing in another state only if the party is before the
Kentucky court or if the state in which the contemnor resides is willing to
use its own contempt sanctions to enforce the Kentucky order."° The
98 See id.
99See id.
00 Both parties appeared in court. This state's power over the mother was not
questioned. The UCCJA does not require personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
parent. See K.R.S. §§ 403.440, .450. Instead, the Kentucky statute focuses on
subject matter jurisdiction. See Cann v. Howard, 850 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App.
1993). However, the mother's appearance before the Kentucky court had a
practical impact. See infra note 104.
101 See Brighty, 883 S.W.2d at 496.
'02 See id.
103 See, e.g., Levis v. Markee, 771 S.W.2d 928 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); In re
Paternity of J.L.V., 426 N.W.2d 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); Marquiss v. Marquiss,
837 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1992). The cases cited by the Kentucky court hold that an
original forum retains jurisdiction to hold a party in contempt as a mechanism for
enforcing its decree, but they do not hold that a forum must enforce a sister state's
contempt order. See also Beck v. Beck, 306 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983)
(holding that the North Carolina court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce
custody order through contempt proceeding against mother; personal jurisdiction
satisfied by service on mother's attorney).
104 In Brighty, the mother's presence in Kentucky allowed the trial court to
enforce its own order for contempt. If the mother had not appeared in the show
cause proceeding and had been long absent from the state, the result is less clear.
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problem of extra-territorial enforcement of the contempt sanction is likely
to involve the same questions that would be raised by the assertion of
modification jurisdiction; that is, a New Jersey court asked to enforce the
Kentucky contempt order would likely ask whether Kentucky had
jurisdiction to issue the order.1"5 Without more, the alleged distinction
between enforcement and modification jurisdiction is not helpful because
it does not answer concretely the question whether Kentucky would claim
the right to control decisions about access to the child in a specific custody
case.
Kentucky courts might adopt rules granting this state's courts
continuing jurisdiction in child custody cases. The federal PKPA gives
Kentucky the right to assert jurisdiction in cases similar to Brighty, but
only if the state claims that jurisdictional right as a matter of state law. °0
Section 454.220 permits the exercise of this state's long-arm jurisdiction in
instances in which a nonresident has been absent from the state for less than one
year. Unless sections of this state's UCCJA serve as an independent long-arm
statute, see K.R.S. §§ 403.430, .5 10, section 454.220 may limit this state's ability
to bind a nonresident. The Brighty court did not discuss the question of personal
jurisdiction over the mother, but other states have implied that a party charged with
contempt may raise that issue. See, e.g., Dyer v. Surratt; 466 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. 1996)
(holding that mother failed to raise issue of personal jurisdiction in a timely
manner). Kentucky case law does not indicate that this state enforces other states'
contempt orders, even when it must decline modification jurisdiction. See Cann v.
Howard, 850 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993), in which an Ohio court had held the
mother in contempt for refusing visitation. The Kentucky court refused to modify
visitation after the mother moved to Kentucky, but there is also no evidence that
it enforced the Ohio court's contempt order. Cf Pretot v. Pretot, 905 S.W.2d 868
(Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that circuit court lacks jurisdiction to hold father in
contempt for violation of sister state child support order); Mott v. Rivazfar, 653
N.Y.S.2d 760 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (declining modification jurisdiction but
refusing to enforce foreign contempt order). A forum state would normally enter
an order domesticating the sister state decree and also enter its own show cause
order for failure to comply with the decree. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 437 So.2d 122
(Ala. Civ. App. 1982) (holding that the enforcing state's contempt rules apply if a
decree is entitled to enforcement); State ex rel. Butlerv. Morgan, 578 P.2d 814 (Or.
Ct. App. 1978) (indicating that a sister state decree registered for enforcement may
be enforced by a contempt order of the court in which the decree is registered).
os See Mott, 653 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (declining modification jurisdiction but
refusing to enforce foreign contempt order).
Io6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d); McLain v. McLain, 569 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997); Shupe v. Shupe, 916 P.2d 744 (Mont. 1996); Petty v. Petty, 890 P.2d
1364 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995). The federal Act does require, as a condition for
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The federal Act's reliance on state law as the basis for the claim of
continuing jurisdiction means that the treatment accorded to Kentucky
decrees by sister states will depend on a clear explanation of this state's
rules.107 If Kentucky decrees are to be respected, enforced, and not
modified by sister states because Kentucky claims continuing jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court of Kentucky must make clear the claim of continuing
jurisdiction.
To date, the supreme court has failed to do so, but there are cases in
which Kentucky appellate courts have flirted with the notion of contin-
uing jurisdiction. In both Dillard v. Dillard"' and Bock v. Graves,"° the
results can best be explained by the concept of continuing jurisdiction.
These cases further increase the uncertainty surrounding continuing
jurisdiction.
The Dillard litigation involved a child whose parents had been
divorced in Kentucky in 1987.11 ° After the divorce, the mother's boyfriend
physically abused the child."' Consequently, the trial court removed the
child from the mother's custody and awarded custody to the father. The
father left Kentucky, resided in South Carolina for several years, and then
moved with the child to Tennessee."2 After the father's new wife reported
the father's acts of domestic violence to the child's mother, the mother
continuing jurisdiction, that one of the parties or the child continue to reside in the
forum that rendered the initial custody decree. See Beddow v. Beddow, 556
N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). Recent cases in which the courts of other
states retained continuing jurisdiction are Smith-Helstrom v. Yonker, 544 N.W.2d
93 (Neb. 1996); Lewis v. Second Judicial District Court, 930 P.2d 770 (Nev. 1997).
"0' State law need not refer specifically to continuing jurisdiction. The UCCJA's
section on significant connection may be interpreted to provide the basis for
continuing jurisdiction. See Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial
Jurisdiction and Continuing Jurisdiction Under the UCCJA, 14 FAM. L.Q. 203
(1980) [hereinafter Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody]; Brigitte M. Bodenheimer,
Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining
Problems: Punitive Decrees, Joint Custody, andExcessive Modifications, 65 CAL.
L. REV. 978 (1977); Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedyfor Children Caught in the Conflict ofLaws,
22 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1218 (1969) [hereinafter Bodenheimer, Legislative
Remedy].
'08 Dillard v. Dillard, 859 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).
"0 Bock v. Graves, 804 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1991).
"0 See Dillard, 859 S.W.2d at 134.
' See id. at 135.
12 See id.
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moved for custody modification in the Allen Circuit Court." 3 The Court of
Appeals of Kentucky held that the trial court had properly exercised
jurisdiction over the child, who retained significant connections with the
state of Kentucky. The Dillard court may have been hampered by an
inadequate trial record, but it nevertheless failed to explain why Kentucky
might appropriately assert jurisdiction to modify custody in the case before
the court. A helpful explanation would have shown that the assumption of
jurisdiction was permissible under the federal PKPA,"4 as long as
Kentucky embraced the notion of continuing jurisdiction as a matter of
state law.
In Bock, the Kentucky trial court granted custody of two children to the
mother when it awarded the divorce, but specifically stated in the decree
that it would retain continuing jurisdiction over the case. 115 The mother
moved from Kentucky, first to Virginia and then to Alaska.1 6 The father
continued to visit the children, but in May 1990, the mother moved in an
Alaska court to modify his visitation. Shortly thereafter, the father asked
the original Kentucky court for a show cause order enforcing visitation.
The trial judge eventually granted the father custody of the children. The
mother then filed a writ of prohibition against the trial judge."7 The
Supreme Court of Kentucky treated the issue of retained jurisdiction as a
factual dispute resting on the particular judge's conduct, but it also denied
the writ of prohibition because there was no conclusive showing that the
trial judge had lost jurisdiction as a matter of law. If earlier precedent
requiring "maximum contacts" between the child and Kentucky had been
applied," 8m the trial judge would have lacked jurisdiction. Bockthus implies
that there are some cases in which Kentucky courts may retain continuing
jurisdiction.
11
3 See id.
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d). Subsection (d) states, "The jurisdiction of a court
of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently with the
provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1)
of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child
or of any contestant." The reference in subsection (d) to subsection (c)(1) means
that the initial forum must have 'jurisdiction under the law of such State." Id. §
1738A(c)(1); see McLain v. McLain, 569 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
..5 SeeBockv. Graves, 804 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1991).
"6 See id. at7.
117 See id. at 8.
"8 See Turley v. Griffin, 508 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974); see also Bryant
v. Bryant, 545 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1977); Honigsberg v. Goad, 550 S.W.2d 471 (Ky.
1976); Hawley v. Shaver, 528 S.W.2d 669 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975).
[VOL. 86
FAMILY LAW
If Dillard and Bock implicate the possibility of continuing juris-
diction, there are other, earlier cases that contradict that possibility."9
Kentucky courts adopted an early rule intended to avoid the inappro-
priate use of the significant connection ground of the UCCJA. 20 They held
that this state could not serve as a child custody forum on the basis of
significant connection when a child had an established home state
elsewhere.'M That rule indicated an admirable attempt at jurisdictional
restraint, but the restraint may have been far broader than was actually
necessary.'2
Several of the seminal cases limiting custody jurisdiction are cases in
which a Kentucky court rendered the initial custody decree, but determined
"I9 See cases cited supra note 118.
120 Like the PKPA, the UCCJA has several grounds for the assumption of
custody jurisdiction, including a finding that the forum is the child's home state,
see K.R.S. § 403.420(1)(a), or that the child and at least one of the contestants has
a significant connection with this state and there is substantial evidence necessary
to the custody decision in this state, see id. § 403.420(1)(b). Under the UCCJA,
home state jurisdiction may be an alternative to significant connection jurisdiction.
The PKPA bars the alternative use of home state and significant connection by
prefacing the significant connection portion of the statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1738A(c)(2)(B)(ii), with the caution that the section may not be used if another
state court can claim home state jurisdiction. See id. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i). In
addition, the PKPA grants superiority to continuing jurisdiction over home state
jurisdiction. See id. § 1738A(d).
12 See Turley, 508 S.W.2d at 764; see also Bryant, 545 S.W.2d at 938;
Honigsberg, 550 S.W.2d at 471; Hawley, 528 S.W.2d at 669.
" One influential interpretation of the UCCJA argues that the drafters intended
that the significant connection section would serve two purposes. The first was to
preserve jurisdiction in a forum that had rendered an initial custody decree; the
second, to provide an alternative for those cases in which a child had no home
state. See Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody, supra note 107, at 208; see also
Bodenheimer, Legislative Remedy, supra note 107, at 1218. However, this view
was not uniformly followed. State courts had some trouble separating the approved
uses ofsignificant connectionjurisdiction, namely, as a fall-back for cases in which
a child did not have a home state and to retain power in the initial forum, from the
easily demonstrated but inappropriate use as an ever-available alternative to home
state jurisdiction. Some states weakened the Uniform Act by asserting initial
jurisdiction in cases in which the alleged significant connections were not more
weighty than the jurisdictional claim of the child's home state. In exercising
restraint and attempting to use significant connection jurisdiction in a limited
manner, Kentucky courts adopted a rule for modification of their own decrees that
would have been more appropriate as a restraint on initial custody decisions.
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that it should not take jurisdiction over the case after the child established
another home state." For example, in Turley v. Griffin, a Kentucky court
rendered the initial divorce decree, but the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
held that this state should not assert jurisdiction to modify custody afterthe
child had been gone from Kentucky for more than six months, 24 the period
required to establish that another state is the home state.
1 25
Given the Turley rule, the appellate court in Dillard might have had
some difficulty in distinguishing Turley and the case before it.'26 Both
involved children who had moved away from Kentucky but had
noncustodial parents who continued to live in the state. Under the PKPA's
rules, these are situations in which a state in Kentucky's position may
indeed claim continuing jurisdiction.' 27 However, Turley's rule purports to
disavow the continuing jurisdiction possibility in favor of the child's new
home state.
A clear judicial explanation of the PKPA's rules in Turley/
DillardBrighty-type cases would provide both assistance and flexibility to
trial courts.'28 Arguably, Kentucky appellate courts neednot reverse Turley
nor abandon the outcome of Brighty in order to claim the benefits of the
continuing jurisdiction rule. The Brighty court distinguished between
enforcement jurisdiction and modification jurisdiction, noting that only
the latter type of case would concern a court with a child's best interest
29
and implying that the supreme court prefers that this state adjudicate
custody only if Kentucky has optimum access to relevant evidence needed
1 See cases cited supra note 118.
'
24 See Turley, 508 S.W.2d at 766.
'25 See K.R.S. § 403.410(5).
,26 See Dillardv. Dillard, 859 S.W.2d 134 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993). AlthoughBock
v. Graves, 804 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1991), might be distinguished because the trial
court's order contained a specific provision for continuing jurisdiction, it seems
illogical to say that a trial court may exercise jurisdiction not recognized by the
state's highest court.
,27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d).
28 The Supreme Court of Kentucky should distinguish between cases similar
to Cann v. Howard, 850 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) and Wieczorek v.
Sebastian, 751 S.W.2d 38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988), and Turley/Dilliard/Brighty cases.
In the CanniWieczorek class of cases, this state's courts have a federally imposed
obligation to enforce the other state's custody decree, which they may not modify
unless the requirements of the PKPA are met. In contrast, Turley/Dilliard/Brighty
cases implicate this state's right to the enforcement of its own decrees elsewhere.
29See Brighty v. Brighty, 883 S.W.2d 494, 496-97 (Ky. 1994).
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for a best interest determination. The Supreme Court of Kentucky could
reasonably hold that Kentucky trial courts may claim continuing juris-
diction in custody cases if Kentucky retains a significant connection to the
child whose custody is in dispute and substantial evidence concerning the
child's best interest is available in this state. 3 ' However, it could also leave
trial courts free to decline continuing jurisdiction if a child's move away
from the state has made the new home state a preferable forum and the
benefits of conducting the litigation in the forum with access to the rele-
vant evidence outweighs any possible unfairness to the Kentucky par-
ent.
31
Such a rule would recognize that the federal Act grants power to an
initial forum to retain continuing jurisdiction, but also that there will be
instances in which the stability arid certainty provided by the federal rule
are outweighed by the possibility that continued litigation in the original
Kentucky forum will result in serious inefficiencies. A Kentucky court
should recognize the federal interest in certainty and stability, prompting
it to retain continuing jurisdiction, when two conditions are present. One
of the conditions relates to fairness; the other relates to efficiency. The
fairness problem can best be illustrated by reference to the position of a
litigant whose child moves away from Kentucky with a custodial parent.
If a move away from Kentucky automatically dissolves the jurisdictional
connection with this state, the move itself can provide a litigation
advantage to the out-of-state party. A Kentucky noncustodial parent whose
child resides elsewhere is always at a disadvantage if subsequent litigation
must go on in the state of the child's residence. The Kentucky resident
must hire an out-of-state attorney, travel to the other state, and finance an
away-from-home court proceeding if he or she wishes to modify custody.
The federal PKPA's offer of continuing jurisdiction makes certain that
130 Jurisdiction retained under the continuing jurisdiction rule trumps the
jurisdiction of the child's new home state. See McDow v. McDow, 908 P.2d 1049
(Alaska 1996). For a discussion of the connections between the child and the state
that might trigger continuing jurisdiction, see Greenlaw v. Smith, 869 P.2d 1024
(Wash. 1994). The Washington court noted that a child should have more than a
slight connection to the state, but also said that continued visitation in the state
would be sufficient. See id. at 1033.
1
3 1 See Pettinato v. Johnson, 674 So.2d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Solomon
v. Solomon, 701 A.2d 1199 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); Manley v. Hoag, 917 P.2d
1011 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996); Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
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litigants whose states do claim continuing jurisdiction are protected from
this possibility.
On the other hand, the advantage as between two parents is not the only
concern that a state might have in a child custody case. Most custody courts
would agree that the child's best interests lie at the heart of custody
litigation. 32 Moreover, a Kentucky court should have no interest in serving
as the custody forum if the child has a long-established residence in another
state, most of the evidence relevant to a custody decision is in that other
state, and there is no evidence that the custodial parent's move or new
residence was part of a scheme to disadvantage the noncustodial parent.
33
In such a case, the Kentucky court's interest in efficient litigation might
outweigh its concern that the noncustodial parent be treated protectively.
If Turley represents that conclusion, its holding could exist alongside a
slightly revised Brighty rule, namely that the Kentucky trial court may
retain continuing jurisdiction when the nonresident parent's activity
strongly implicates fairness concerns, because it intentionally disadvan-
tages the other party.
Kentucky courts also have faced cases involving international cus-
tody disputes. In Harsacky v. Harsacky,13 1 the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky held that Finland was not the "habitual residence" of minor
children who had recently emigrated to the United States, rejecting the
mother's arguments that would have deprived this state of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Harsackys had moved from Finland to Texas, but
Mr. Harsacky was unable to find work in that state. After the couple
separated, Mr. Harsacky came to northern Kentucky, where he had
relatives. Mrs. Harsacky argued that the children's habitual residence was
in Finland and that, under the Hague Convention On International Child
Abduction, 13 custody had to be adjudicated in that country. The Court
of Appeals of Kentucky held that the Harsacky's "settled purpose" in
132 Many state legislatures agree. See, e.g., K.R.S. § 403.270.
13 A parent's willful conduct in impeding visitation would be a ground for
asserting continuing jurisdiction. See Wilson v. Wilson, 465 S.E.2d 44 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1996), a case inwhich the initial forum refused to decline jurisdiction not
only because of the child's continued connection to the forum, but also because of
the custodial parent's willful activity.
134 Harsacky v. Harsacky, 930 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
135 See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion, S. Doc. No. 99-11 (1985) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
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moving to the United States made this country the children's habitual
residence.'36
The Hague Convention, and its federal implementing statute, the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"),' 1 provide
remedies for parents of children who have been wrongfully removed from
the country of their habitual residence.13 1 If a parent seeking the child's
return proves that the child was removed from its habitual residence, the
forum must order the child's return and may not consider the under-
lying custody dispute.139 As a result, any custody determination must be
made in the country of habitual residence. As the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted, habitual residence is not the
same as domicile. 14 A child's domicile is generally determined as a matter
of law, but habitual residence is a factual determination based on the
child's past experience rather than the future intentions of his or her
parents.1
41
The Harsacky court's use of the parental "settled purpose" to make the
habitual residence determination focused on the intention of the children's
parents in moving to the United States. The appellate court found that the
move was more than a temporary one, enabling the children to acquire an
American habitual residence.42 This analysis unfortunately confuses
136 See Barsacky, 930 S.W.2d at 414-15.
137 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994).
.3 See Hague Convention, supra note 134. For an excellent primer on the
Hague Convention and the implementing legislation, the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act ("ICARA"), see Linda Silberman, Hague Convention On
International ChildAbduction: A Brief Overview and Case LawAnalysis, 28 FAM.
L.Q. 9 (1994). Ifaparent proves that children have been wrongfully removed from
a habitual residence, only limited defenses prevent the child's return. Article 13b
of the Hague Convention provides a defense if return would cause grave risk of
physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
position. Article 20 provides a defense if the country to which return is sought does
not provide for fundamental human rights.
139 See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993).
'40 See id.; see also Silberman, supra note 138, at 20-24.
4"See Silberman, supranote 138, at20-24. For a general discussion of habitual
residence see GRAHAM & KELLER, supra note 9, § 14.48.
142 A move need not be permanent to result in a child's acquisition of a habitual
residence. See Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that
it was immaterial that the child had not lived in Australia for as long as he had lived
in the United States; Australia was the habitual residence).
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domicile and habitual residence. 143 A more appropriate inquiry would have
asked whether the children's residence in this country was so significant
that their presence here could be described as habitual. No particular time
is required to establish a habitual residence.1" Parents need not necessarily
establish a domicile in this country, but the children's presence here must
be complete and longstanding enough to be habitual. If children have been
enrolled in school for some time and have formed new relationships or
social attachments, their presence is more likely to be habitual.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE RULES
GOVERNING CHILD CUSTODY
Several changes mark important trends in Kentucky child custody
decisions. First, appellate courts have not only accepted joint custody as a
possible resolution for child custody disputes, but they also have embraced
the joint custody concept. 4 Second, appellate courts have required parties
seeking custody modification to meet rigorous standards, 146 whether the
modification would change a sole custody or joint custody arrangement.
Finally, major litigation has addressed both third-party custody'47 and
grandparent visitation rights.
148
43 In addition to physical presence, domicile depends on the intention to remain
for an indefinite period of time. See St. John v. St John, 163 S.W.2d 820, 822-23
(Ky. 1942). Children take their parents' domicile as a matter of law since they do
not have the capacity for the requisite intention.
'44 See Feder, 63 F.3d at 217.
14 See Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. 1993) (court-ordered joint
custody permissible); Hazel v. Wells, 918 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (joint
custody of child born out-of-wedlock affected dispute over child's appropriate
surname); Aton v. Aton, 911 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (joint custody award
does not require equal residential custody); Chalupa v. Chalupa, 830 S.W.2d 391
(Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (joint custody the preferred solution).
' See Quisenberry v. Quisenberry, 785 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1990) (holding that
pursuant to section 403.340(2)(c), a party seeking modification of a custody decree
must demonstrate serious endangerment to child's physical, mental, moral, or
emotional well-being as a predicate to modification).
147 See Greathouse v. Shreve, 891 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1995); Shifflet v. Shifflet,
891 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1995); Fitch v. Bums, 782 S.W.2d 618 (Ky. 1989); Davis v.
Collingsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1989).
' See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992);
Baker v. Perkins, 774 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989).
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The supreme court's decision in Squires v. Squires '49 stopped short of
treatingjoint custody as a statutorily preferred solution in custody disputes,
primarily because the Kentucky custody statute states no legislative
preference. 150 Nevertheless, the court spoke at length about the benefits of
joint custody and permitted trial courts to impose joint custody on
objecting parents as long as the child's best interest was served by a joint
custody award. The court indicated that a child's best interest would be
served by a joint custody award unless there was no reasonable likelihood
of future parental cooperation."'
In subsequent cases, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky has addressed
joint custody modification." Modification of joint custody requires
preliminary findings that parents can no longer cooperate. In Mennemeyer
,49 Squires v. Squires, 854 S.W.2d 765 (Ky. 1993). At least one intermediate
appellate opinion announces a "preference" for joint custody. See Chalupa, 830
S.W.2d at 391. The trend toward joint custody encompasses children born out-of-
wedlock. See Hazel, 918 S.W.2d at 742. In Hazel the parties disputed the child's
surname. The appellate court held that the best-interest test should apply in
determining the child's surname and listed a number of factors for trial courts to
consider in evaluating the child's best interest. See id. at 744-45. Some ofthe Hazel
factors are similar to those discussed in Squires. Both appellate opinions permit
trial courts to consider whether joint custody or bearing a father's surname will
strengthen the bond between the child and his or her father. Less optimistic readers
may wonder whether courts should distinguish between awarding joint custody
because of an existing parent-child bond and awarding joint custody to promote
bonding. Similar concerns might arise over naming. In spite of the Squires court's
statement that post-dissolution families should mirror intact families, there are
instances in which that general homily may be dangerous for children. Imposing
joint custody on a family that has experienced a pattern of domestic violence can
subject both parents and children to continued danger.
"I Section 403.270 permits a trial court to award joint custody if it is in the best
interest of the child.
151 Significant risks might attend a parent's refusal to cooperate if a trial court
found that refusal to be unwarranted. Nationally, a number of courts have imposed
"friendly parent" rules, awarding custody to the parent most likely to provide
reasonable access to the other parent. See Ford v. Ford, 700 So.2d 191, 196-97
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing relationship between "friendly parent" rules
and domestic violence problems).
152 Cases decided before Squires had held that a court modifying ajoint custody
award was required to conduct a de novo hearing on the assumption that a joint
custody award was "no award." See Erdman v. Clements, 780 S.W.2d 635, 637
(Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Benassi v. Havens, 710 S.W.2d 867,869 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986).
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v. Mennemeyer, 5 the court held that a trial court inappropriately modified
the residential placement of a child whose parents had joint custody
because the lower court made no finding of inability or bad faith refusal to
cooperate.1 4 Similarly, in Stinnett v. Stinnett,' the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky held that a trial court may not conduct the required modification
hearing without some showing that one or both of the parties cannot
cooperate as a joint custodian.'56
Appellate courts should reconsider the rules adopted in Mennemeyer
andStinnett, and should also rethink appellate decisions holding that aprior
joint custody award is not a true award of custody.157 Squires makes clear
that joint custody is an option available to a trial court convinced that joint
decision-making is inthe child's best interest. Ifjoint custody is a co-equal
possibility with sole custody, it ought to be governed by the same statutory
scheme,' unless there are other structural reasons fortreatingjoint custody
differently.
There are two important aspects to joint custody. The first is the right
of decision-making. In joint custody, both parents must cooperate in
making decisions about the child's care, training, and protection. Neither
parent's decisional right outweighs the other's, unless the court specifies
that one of the parents will control a particular decision.159 A second aspect
ofjoint custody concerns the child's physical placement. Even thoughjoint
custodians must cooperate on making decisions forthe child's welfare, they
cannot both have physical custody of the child at the same time. In many
cases, the parents will cooperate in planning for a child's residential
placement; in some cases, a court will have to dictate the residential
arrangements for the child because the parents cannot agree. Decision-
making rights and residential placement are not necessarily co-extensive.160
One parent might have equal decision-making power with the other parent,
'53 Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d 555 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
'
5 4 See id. at 557-58.
's Stinnett v. Stinnett, 915 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
156 See id. at 324.
'
57 See Erdman, 780 S.W.2d at 637; Benassi, 710 S.W.2d at 869.
15 Arguably then, joint custody modification would be subject to section
403.340 (modification of custody decree) and subject to the standard set out in
Quisenberry v. Quisenberry, 785 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1990). See supra note 146 and
accompanying text.
"'59 See Burchell v. Burchell, 684 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
1
60 See Aton v. Aton, 911 S.W.2d 612, 614-15 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).
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but have actual physical custody of the child for a smaller portion of the
time.
Mennemeyer's rule treats the two aspects ofjoint custody as inextrica-
bly intertwined, holding that a court cannot alter residential placement
without finding that joint custody should not continue.' 6 ' On the facts of
Mennemeyer, the rule may be explicable. The mother intended to move to
Florida and to take the child with her. The father sought to have placement
altered so that the child would reside with him.'62 Thus, the Mennemeyer
facts interwove decision-making power (about where the child would live)
with residential placement. To the extent that a child's residence is a
decision made by his or her parents, arguments over residential placement
of a child inherently involve disputes about decisions affecting the child.
The reverse, however, may not be true. Some decision-oriented arguments
may not involve residential placement. 63
Keeping the two aspects ofjoint custody separate would help appellate
courts develop a modification standard that fits within this state's statutory
directives,'" but takes into account differences between the structure of
sole custody and joint custody's more flexible structure. Joint custody
awards should be modifiable whenever parental inability to cooperate has
a significant, negative impact on the child, the standard required by section
403.340 in all cases. The provisions of section 403.340 that predicate
modification on proof of new facts, arising after the previous decree or
unknown to the court at the time the prior decree was entered, should apply
in joint custody modification, as should the statutory requirement that the
child's present condition seriously endanger his or her physical, mental,
moral, or emotional health.
Courts should interpret section 403.340's demand that the present
custodian be retained to mean that the prior arrangement will be retained
unless it would cause serious harm to the child. However, a sensible
appellate rule would permit a trial court to alter residential placement
without altering decision-making authority except in respect to residence.
Trial courts should be given the freedom to identify and correct that portion
of the joint custody award that has malfunctioned, preserving those aspects
,61 See Mennemeyer v. Mennemeyer, 887 S.W.2d 555, 557-58 (Ky. Ct. App.
1994).
162 See id. at 556. For an extended discussion of parent relocation, see 16
GRAHAM & KELLER, supra note 9, § 21:24.
"' See Burchell v. Burchell, 684 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
16 See K.R.S. § 403.340 (Michie Supp. 1996).
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of the award that are not problematic. Moreover, the rule that modification
ofjoint custody requires a de novo hearing, as if no award had been made,
is contrary to the modification statute (section 403.340), unrealistic, and
wasteful of court resources.
Third-party custody rights and grandparent visitation continue to raise
issues for Kentucky courts. At the same time that grandparents have been
granted greater access to children through the implementation of a
grandparent visitation statute"'5 and case law interpreting that statute,'6
grandparents have also been subject to a strict standard requiring proof of
parental unfitness when they seek child custody. 67 These trends may
provide both too much and too little, as the trends favor grandparents
seeking visitation against the united wishes of parties to an intact
marriage, 6 1 but give no weight to a grandparent's defacto child custody
exercised over a significant period of time.
Appellate courts in this state generally have followed a standard
requiring a third party seeking child custody to show parental unfitness, 69
a rule that applies to grandparents seeking child custody. Recent appellate
decisions emphasize the unfitness standard in new contexts, focusing on a
parent's "superior right" to custody in instances in which a defacto parent
cannot show waiver of the parent's right. The decisions demand that trial
courts consider the waiver issue carefully, even when the third party has
had actual custody of the child for a substantial period of time. In
Greathouse v. Shreve,7' the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a father
whose child had been in the maternal grandmother's custody for a number
of years had not necessarily waived his superior right to custody because
he did not know that he had a right to custody.'71 In Shifflet v. Shifflet,'" the
161 Section 405.021 recently has been amended to provide that grandparent
visitation may survive termination of the parental rights of the grandparent's son
or daughter, unless the circuit court finds that the child's best interest precludes the
visitation. See id. § 405.021(1). The statute also provides that a court may grant
"noncustodial parent visitation rights" to a grandparent whose son or daughter is
deceased and who provides child support for the child. Id. § 405.021(3).
166 See text accompany infra notes 180-82.
167The unfitness standard comes from section 405.020.
168 SeeKingv. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992).
169 See K.R.S. § 405.020; see also Fitch v. Bums, 782 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Ky.
1989); Davis v. Collingsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329,330 (Ky. 1989); Sumnerv. Roark,
836 S.W.2d 434,439 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
170 Greathouse v. Shreve, 891 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1995).
171 See id. at 388, 391.
172 Shifflet v. Shifflet, 891 S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1995).
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same court imposed a similar rule in a contest between the child's natural
mother and her maternal grandmother, requiring the waiver to be shown by
clear and convincing evidence."
The constitutionally protected nature of the parent-child relationship
underlies the requirement that a third party generally show parental
unfitness to gain child custody in preference to the child's parent. 74 Courts
considering protection of the parent-child relationship should note,
however, that the protection afforded is not absolute. 75 Moreover, the
Constitution protects the relationship between parents and their children,
not the mere status of parent and child without the supporting relationship.
For example, in more than one case the United States Supreme Court has
noted that a state rule permitting the termination of an unwed father's
parental rights if he has no previous relationship with his biological child
does not violate constitutional standards of fairness. 176
States also have a protective obligation toward minor children.177 When
the state's protective obligation and its role asparenspatriae over minor
children clashes with the protected nature of the parent-child relationship,
the protective role may weigh more heavily in the constitutional balance.
These general rules might inform debate over third-party custody rights
in Kentucky. Removal of children from a long-term custodian serving as
a defacto parent raises the prospect of significant emotional damage to the
child, particularly if that defacto parent has served as the child's exclusive
care-giver. 78 Focusing on parental waiver of superior custody rights in
these cases gives no weight to the state's duty to protect the child's welfare
and no thoughtful consideration to the child's independent rights.
Grandparents and other third parties who serve as long-term de facto
custodians should be able to raise the child's interests and needs without
171 See id. at 394.
'74 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
"75 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983).
1
76 See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
17 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
178 See generally Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grand-
children: Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315 (1994);
Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together Again:
Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-Party Custody Cases, 37
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045 (1996); Susan L. Waysdorf, Families in the AIDS
Crisis: Access, Equality, Empowerment, and the Role of Kinship Caregivers, 3
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 145 (1994).
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resorting to proof of parental waiver in a manner similar to criminal cases
or contractual disputes.
7 9
At the same time that Kentucky courts have limited the rights of
grandparents to seek custody by nnposmg the third-party standard, they
have interpreted the grandparent visitation statute expansively In King v.
King, 8 the Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld both the constitutionality
of the grandparent visitation statute and a trial court order granting
visitation to a grandfather whose son and daughter-in-law wished to deny
that visitation. King establishes that grandparent visitation maybe awarded
outside of the divorce context. A visitation award does require a best-
interest determination by the trial court.'8 ' In King, the child's parents
conceded that they had no safety concerns and acknowledged that the
grandfather loved and cared for the child, with whom he had a longstanding
relationship.
82
V CHILD SUPPORT
Child support continues to be an area of both legislative and judicial
activity The Kentucky legislature made the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act ("UIFSA") effective January 1, 1998, as mandated by federal
law 183 In addition, courts have clarified some aspects of child support
guidelines.1
84
UIFSA may change several aspects of Kentucky child support law The
Act's provisions provide expansive jurisdiction to determine child
179 A long-term defacto custodian's ability to retain custody of a minor child
need not necessarily mean that a parent would entirely lack access to the child.
Parents could retain visitation rights, see K.R.S. § 403.320, and they might also
regain custody under the custody modification statute, see id. § 403.340. However,
a child's interests and needs, rather than parental rights, would be the primary focus
of the litigation.
"0 King v King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 941 (1992).
181 See id. at 631.
' See id. at 632-33.
18 3 See42 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). Congress has also enacted the Federal Full Faith
And CreditFor Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, which bars a second
state's modification of a previously entered child support order if the order was
made consistently with the Act. See generally Patricia Wick Hatainyar, Critical
Applications and Proposals for Improvement of the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 71 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv 1 (1997).
184 See text accompanying infra notes 244-68.
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support,15 although other Kentucky statutes mayhampertheAct's intended
effectiveness.'86 The Act will replace the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act ("URESA")8 7 and will eventually result in a nationwide
system in which only one state has jurisdiction to modify support awards.1
88
UIFSA will apply to support orders for minor children and spouses or
former spouses. 89 The Act governs the treatment of both temporary and
final orders of support,"9 whether the order provides for monetary support
or for other payments, such as payments for health care, reimbursement of
arrearages, or payments of costs and attorney fees.'9 '
The Act's basic structure models the federal PKPA,'92 adopting a
scheme that demands enforcement of previously entered orders as long as
the state issuing the order had appropriate jurisdiction. 193 The Act expands
185 See K.R.S. § 407.5201. For example, section 8 provides that this state may
assert personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with the state and federal
Constitutions. A number of states continue to treat the presence of a child within
the state as insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction overa nonresident obligor.
See Heineken v. Heineken, 683 So.2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Heinle v.
Fourth Judicial District Court, 861 P.2d 171 (Mont 1993); In re Marriage of Peck,
920 P.2d 236 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). That result is compelled by the United States
Supreme Court decision in Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84
(1978) (holding that divorced father inNew York, who allowed his daughter to live
with her mother in California, was not thereby subject to in personam jurisdiction
in California in mother's action for child custody). Moreover, there are cases in
which a parent's attempts to enforce visitation are not treated as actions subjecting
him or her to personal jurisdiction. See Puhlman v. Turner, 874 P.2d 291 (Alaska
1994); Cann v. Howard, 850 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993).
"6 See text accompanying infra note 197.
117 K.R.S. §§ 407.010-480.
188 For an excellent discussion of the Act and its relation to the Federal Full
Faith and Credit For Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B, see Hatamyar,
supra note 183. See also Margaret Campbell Haynes, Federal Full Faith and
Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 14 DEL. LAW. 26 (Spring 1996).
89 See K.RS. § 407.5101(3) (defining duty of support).
' Although section 407.5101(21) defines support order to include atemporary
order, other statutory sections provide that temporary support orders issued ex parte
or pending resolution ofajurisdictional conflict do not create continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal. See id. § 407.5205(5).
'91 See id. § 407.5101(21) (defining support order).
192 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
See K.R.S. § 407.5205 (granting continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to a
tribunal issuing an order consistent with forum law, which would include the
requirement of personal jurisdiction over the obligor, see id. § 407.5201).
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this state's ability to claim jurisdiction over nonresidents beyond the
boundaries now permissible under section 454.220, the family obligations
long-arm statute. In many cases, Kentucky courts will be able to use
section 407.5201, the UIFSA jurisdictional statute, to claim personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident parent, issue an appropriate support order,
and demand enforcement of that order by other states. 94 In some cases,
however, Kentucky will not be able to claim personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident obligor. If a state in which a possible support recipient resides
lacks personal jurisdiction over the obligor, the recipient may use the Act's
two-state procedure to establish support. 19 However, a sister state
establishing the support order will then have continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over support determinations and that state's order will be
enforceable and not subject to modification by a Kentucky court.
196
The extended personal jurisdiction available under the Act could be
limited by other Kentucky statutes addressing personal jurisdiction.
Commentators have long noted that section 454.165 stands as a barrier to
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over some nonresidents who otherwise
might be subject to jurisdiction without violating any federal constitutional
strictures. 97 Section 454.165 provides that no personal judgment may be
194 The UIFSA jurisdictional statute permits this state to claim personal
jurisdiction on the following bases: (1) the individual obligor is personally served
within this state; (2) the individual obligor consents to jurisdiction or waives the
personal jurisdiction issue; (3) the obligor resided in this state with the child; (4)
the individual resided in this state and provided prenatal expenses and support for
the child; (5) the child resides in this state as a result of the obligor's acts or
directives; (6) the obligor engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child
may have been conceived by that act of intercourse; (7) the individual asserted
parentage in a putative father registry; and (8) on any other basis consistent with
the United States and state Constitutions. See id. § 407.5201.
195 See id. §§ 407.5203, .5304, .5305.
196 See Hatamyar, supra note 183, at 36-38. The same result could occur in a
modification scenario. As Professor Hatamyar notes, a recipient could seek an
increase in child support while residing in State A by proceeding in that state if
State A had entered the original child support order and the recipient continued to
reside in the state. If, however, the recipient chooses to seek modification in the
obligor's state, State B, she must consent to that state's jurisdiction and State B
thereafter has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order, at least as long as
the obligor resides in State B. See id. at 37-38.
"' See John R. Leathers, Rethinking Jurisdiction and Notice in Kentucky 71
KY. L. J. 755 (1982-83) (drawing attention to the difficulties caused by section
454.165).
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entered against a party who is constructively served unless he or she is
served pursuant to section 454.210, the general long-arm statute. Nothing
in the UIFSA provides for service through the general long-arm statute's
mechanisms. However, no section of the statute forbids such service, and
section 407.5202 provides that a tribunal exercising personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident may apply the forum's procedural and substantive law
If section 407.5202 were read as a directive requiring service pursuant to
section 454.210(3), the general long-arm statute, the limitations in section
454.165 might be avoided. A better solution could be crafted by the
General Assembly, for that body could amend section 454.165 so that it did
not apply to obligations arsing from marriage or the parent-child relation-
ship.
Kentucky's jurisdiction may also be limited by UIFSA's rule on
simultaneous proceedings. 19 Under the simultaneous proceedings rule, a
prior petition filed in another state can cut off this state's ability to assume
jurisdiction. Ifthe Kentuckypetition is the second-filedpetition, this state's
court may exercise jurisdiction only if two conditions are met. First, the
Kentucky petition must have been filed before the time for filing a
responsive pleading expired in the other state.199 Second, the party
contesting jurisdiction in the state of the first-filed petition must make a
timely jurisdictional challenge in that state.
2
10
If Kentucky gains personal jurisdiction over a nonresident obligor
under section 407.5201, the trial court may apply the Kentucky child
support guidelines to determine the child support obligation. UIFSA's
choice-of-law rule for single-state proceedings is contained in section
407.5202, which provides that a state with personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident may apply not only its own procedural and substantive rules,
but its own choice-of-law rules to determine the support obligation.
Future litigation will define more clearly the relationship between
jurisdiction and choice of law in child support cases. For the present,
however, UIFSA's introduction raises some interestingpossibilities. When
Kentucky acts in a single state proceeding, UIFSA directs the use of this
198 See K.P.S. § 407.5204.
199 See id. § 407.5204(1)(a). Similar rules also limit this state's ability to act
when the petition filed in Kentucky is the first petition, but the respondent makes
a timely jurisdictional challenge in Kentucky and files a petition in the other state
before the time expires for filing a responsive pleading under Kentucky's rules.
200 See id. § 407.5204(1)(b). However, if the second-filed petition is filed in the
child's home state, that state has priority over the first-filed state to determine child
support. See id. § 5204(2)(c); see also Hatamyar, supra note 183, at 17
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state's general choice-of-law rules,2°' rather than the UIFSA choice-of-law
rules applicable to actions in which Kentucky is a responding state or
enforcement proceedings.2 Kentucky's general approach to choice of law
has varied over time, but may be characterized as involving either
governmental interest analysis or most-significant-relationship determina-
tions.203 Kentucky has no specific choice-of-law rule for child support
determinations, unless section 403.212 is interpreted as a statutory directive
on choice of law. 04 If the child support guidelines statute is not a choice-
of-law directive, a trial court arguably might be free to use general choice-
of-law rules.
Choice-of-law considerations are not likely to play a large role in child
support determinations, but they could surface as more than a theoretical
exercise in some instances°.20 Kentucky's general choice-of-law rules have
called for the application of this state's laws when the litigation involved
201 See K.R.S. § 407.5202 (single-state proceeding); id. § 407.5303 (Kentucky
acting as responding state).
202 See id. § 407.5604.
203 See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Arnett v. Thompson, 433
S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967). For cases
involving contracts, appellate courts have adopted a most-significant-relationship
approach. See Paine v. LaQuinta Motor Inns, Inc., 736 S.W.2d 355 (Ky. Ct. App.
1987), overruled on other grounds by Oliver v. Schultz, 885 S.W.2d 699 (Ky.
1994).
204 K.R.S. Section 403.212(1) provides that "[t]he following provisions and
child support table shall be the child support guidelines established for the
Commonwealth of Kentucky." An appellate court might read this section to mean
that in any child support proceeding in this state, the legislature intended for the
Kentucky child support guidelines to apply. Another possible explanation is that
the legislature never gave any thought to choice of law in developing the child
support guidelines. Like workers' compensation or other administrative
proceedings, child support determinations have no choice-of-law function. A court
with jurisdiction applies its own guidelines to resolve the case, and any interested
state with jurisdiction may apply its rule without violating constitutional
prohibitions.
205 One possible area might involve the age of majority and consequent
termination of child support duties. See Tucker v. Hill, 763 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that Kentucky's age of majority terminated father's support
duty after Indiana divorce obligations were subject of enforcement proceeding in
this state). UIFSA would change this result. In an enforcement proceeding, section
407.5604 provides that the issuing state's law governs the nature, extent, amount,
and duration of support.
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a false conflict. °6 One might argue that there are some child support cases
in which another state's child support guidelines should be applied because
any conflict between those guidelines and the Kentucky guidelines is a
false conflict. Suppose, for example, that a Kentucky trial court had
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident obligor from another state whose
child support guidelines provided extended support for college education.
2 7
A Kentucky trial court might apply the other state's rule under either a
most-significant-relationship or governmental interest analysis. The court
could theorize that Kentucky's child support guidelines were not intended
to limit the obligations of nonresidents or to punish resident children.0 8 In
that case, the court's choice between the higher obligation produced by the
sister state guidelines and the lower obligation produced by the Kentucky
guidelines would depend on consideration of the statute's underlying
policies and considerations of fairness to both parties, including an
examination of the parties' expectations.0 9
If a Kentucky court issues a child support order consistent with this
state's laws,10 it has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order as
2 SeeArnett, 433 S.W.2d at 109; Wessling, 417 S.W.2d at 259. A false conflict
occurs when only one state has any interest in the application of its policy to
resolve the dispute. See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1980).
207 The obligor may have consented to this state's jurisdiction, been served
within the state, or fall under one of the other provisions of section 407.5201. For
purposes of this hypothetical, the child lives in Kentucky at the time of the action.
208 Of course, there is also an argument that this state's legislature has set the
standard for support for children residing in this state by implementing child
support guidelines. To make a support award under another state's higher
standards, the trial court would have to interpret the child support guidelines as
minimum standards that might not apply if party expectations made it more fair to
rely on another state's guidelines. For example, an obligor who lived for a
significant period of time with children in another state might be said to expect the
application of that state's standard although he or she might not be subject to its
personal jurisdiction.
I A similar result is not possible when Kentucky acts as a responding state to
award support for nonresident children because the UIFSA choice-of-law rules
dictate the use of the forum state's child support guidelines. See K.R.S. §
407.5303(2).
210The rules for continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support orders
are somfiewhat different. Section 407.5205(6) provides that aKentucky court issuing
a spousal support order has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction "throughout the
existence of the support obligation." Id. The act does not require the supported
spouse to maintain a Kentucky residence and does not specify which state's law
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long as Kentucky remains the residence of the obligor, the individual
obligee, or the child,2" unless each individual party files a written consent
permitting another state's tribunal to assume continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction.212 The Act's continuing, exclusive jurisdiction provisions
prohibit modification of the order by another state's tribunal and require
other states to enforce the order without modification.
Not all child support determinations can be resolved under UIFSA's
single-state procedure, in spite of the significant expansion of grounds for
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident obligors. The Act,
therefore, incorporates rules for two-state proceedings. Two-state
proceedings may be used to establish support orders2"3 and to enforce
support orders and income-withholding orders from another state without
registration.
214
In two-state proceedings, Kentucky may serve either as the initiating
or responding tribunal. If Kentucky serves as the initiating tribunal,2 15 this
state forwards the statutorily required documents to the appropriate court,
support enforcement agency, or state information agency in a responding
state. 6 As responding tribunals, Kentucky courts have numerous powers,
including the ability to issue or enforce a support order,217 render a
paternity judgment,218 order income withholding,219 determine arrearages
and specify the method of payment,220 enforce orders by civil or criminal
contempt,"' set aside property for the payment of support obligations,'
place liens on property or order execution on the obligor's property m
require the obligor to provide the court with personal information on
determines whether the obligation continues.
211 See K.R.S. § 407.5205(1)(a).
212 See id. § 407.5205(1)(b).
213 See id. § 407.5301(2)(a).
214 See id. § 407.5301(2)(b). Separate rules apply to the enforcement of support
orders registered in this state. See id. §§ 407.5601-.5608.
215 A proceeding in an initiating state may be commenced either by an
individual petitioner or an agency providing support. See id. § 407.5301(3).216 See id. § 407.5304.
217 See id. § 407.5305(2)(a).
218 See id. § 407.5305(2)(b).
219 See id. § 407.5305(c).
0 See id. § 407.5305(d).
22' See id. § 407.5305(e).
2
n See id. § 407.5305(f).
223 See id. § 407.5305(g).
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location and employment,- 4 issue bench warrants or writs of arrest in
appropriate cases, 25 enter seek work orders,226 and award reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs.'
UIFSA directs a forum, acting as a responding tribunal, to apply the
child support guidelines of the forum state to determine the amount of
support payable by the obligor. 11 8 The same rule applies in other states
acting as responding tribunals. If a Kentucky court cannot assert personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident obligor pursuant to section 407.5201, a
Kentucky petitioner may use the two-state process to claim support against
the nonresident. In that case, Kentucky will serve as the initiating state and
the obligor's state will be the responding state. The support payable will be
determinedby the responding state's child support guidelines. 29 Moreover,
once the responding state issues the child support order, that state is the
state with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction overthe order because it is the
forum that issued the child support order.-3 The responding state then
remains the forum with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction as long as the
obligor resides in that state and no statutory, written consent to alter
jurisdiction is filed.' 1
The Act permits a party to register an order issued in another state for
enforcement in Kentucky. 3 Kentucky courts must recognize and enforce
orders issued by other states and registered in this state,' 3 but may not
modify those orders as long as the issuing state had and retains jurisdiction.
This UIFSA section should work a significant change in the enforcement
process. Under URESA, a child support order was often subject to modifi-
cation in the second forum because the judgment was modifiable in the first
forum. As a result, an order issued in one state could be modified by a
second state, although the modification did not nullify the initial order's
See id. § 407.5305(h).
See id. § 407.5305(i).
6See id. § 407.53050).
See id. § 407.5305(k).
See id. § 407.5303(2). Support guidelines also determine an obligor's sup-
port duty.
"-- Section 407.5604 would have a counterpart in the responding state's law.
2
'
0 See id. § 407.5205.
23, See id. §§ 407.5205, .5206.
" See id. §§ 407.5601. The rules on registration apply both to support orders
and to income-withholding orders. See id. See section 407.5602 for the procedure
to register an order for enforcement.
23 See id. § 407.5603.
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effectiveness, at least within the state that issued the initial order." This
produced two orders, each with spheres of validity. An obligor who
satisfied the order of his or her own current state nevertheless might be
accruing arrearages in a state that issued a prior order. UIFSA corrects that
problem by denying to the second, enforcing forum the right to modify the
issuing state's order, unless the issuing state no longer has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction.23
Section 407.5604 provides specifically that the issuing state's law
governs the nature, extent, amount, and duration of support payments, the
payment of other support obligations, andthe payment of arrearages. 36 For
example, a Kentucky court must now enforce support obligations for post-
secondary education if the issuing state ordered the payment of that
obligation, even though the general Kentucky rule does not require
payment of college expenses. 37 Similarly, an order with an automatic
escalation clause or an order for higher payments than those called for
under Kentucky guidelines would be enforceable in this state without
modification.
Enforcement choice-of-law provisions generally require the enforcing
state to respect the determinations of the issuing state, but this rule has one
exception. Under section 407.5604, the statute of limitations in a proceed-
ing for arrearages is the statute in the issuing state or the enforcing state,
whichever provides a longer period of time.238
"' Kentucky appellate courts held that this rule prevented Kentucky from
granting a modification to a nonresident recipient, even when this state, acting as
a responding state, was the obligor's residence. See Commonwealth ex rel. Ball v.
Musiak, 775 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989). UIFSA would permit modifi-
cation of the sister state order, but only if the recipient consents in writing to this
state's modification jurisdiction. Thereafter, this state would retain continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over the order.
" Section 407.5611 provides that a forum in which a child support order is
registered for enforcement may modify that order only if, after notice and hearing,
it finds that none of the parties continue to reside in the issuing state, the petitioner
is not a resident of the forum, and the respondent is subject to the forum's personal
jurisdiction. Modification is also permitted if a party or child is subject to personal
jurisdiction and all parties have filed certain written consents in the issuing tribunal.
See id.
236 See id. § 407.5611.
" Cf Tucker v. Hill, 763 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that child
support payments cease at age eighteen where Indiana decree was silent regarding
termination date).
238 Statutes of limitation may reflect a forum's interest in preventing stale
litigation or the forum's notion of repose to the defendant. See Walker v. Armco
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Because states will continue to face the problem of multiple child
support orders for some time, UIFSA provides a hierarchy to determine the
order entitled to enforcement. Section 407.5207 states that Kentucky courts
must apply the following rules to determine the child support order entitled
to enforcement. Kentucky courts must recognize and enforce another
state's child support order if only one order has been issued.z2 9 If two or
more tribunals have issued child support orders for the same obligor and
child, and only one of those tribunals would have continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction under UIFSA, the order from the state with continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction must be recognized.' 4 If two or more tribunals have
issued orders and more than one of those tribunals could claim continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction, the Act provides two different possibilities. First, if
one of the states issuing an order is the child's current home state,24' that
order must be recognized. If not, the most recent order must be
recognized. 42 If previous orders have been issued for the same obligor and
child by two or more states, none of which would have continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction, the forum state may issue an order that will then be
recognized by other states.243 Of course, the forum state must meet all of
the other prerequisites for continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, the most
important of which is that it have personal jurisdiction over the obligor and
remain the residence of at least one of the parties.
The federally mandated imposition of child support guidelines in all
states,2" including Kentucky, has refocused child support disputes from
questions of equity within an individual family to interpretation of the
particular state's child support guidelines. 5 Kentucky child support
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980). A forum's application of its own statute of
limitations does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722-29 (1988).
29 See K.R.S. § 407.5207(1)(a).240 See id. § 407.5207(l)(b).
241 See id. § 407.5207(1)(c). Section 407.5101(4) defines "home state." The
definition is the same as that used in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
See id. § 403.410(5).242 See id. § 407.5207(1)(c).
243 See id. § 407.5207(1)(d).
244 See generally Linda D. Elrod, Child Support Reassessed: Federalization of
Enforcement Nears Completion, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 695.
245 See Margaret Campbell Haynes, A Review of Child Support Guidelines:
Interpretation and Application, 31 FAM. L.Q. 133 (1997) (reviewing LAURA
MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION).
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guidelines are no exception to this trend.246 The primary area of interpretive
concern for Kentucky courts has related to determinations of income under
the child support guidelines.
Kentucky's child support guidelines determine child support obliga-
tions by reference to the gross income of both parents.247 In many cases,
actual parental gross income is readily determinable, but there are some
cases in which one parent alleges that the reported gross income of the
other parent is not an appropriate gauge of ability to pay child support
because it does not reflect actual earning capacity. 4 If a court determines
that one or both parents is either voluntarily unemployed or underem-
ployed, it may calculate child support based on potential income, setting
the obligation by earning capacity rather than by actual earnings.249
The statutory section permitting a court to determine child support
obligations by reference to earning capacity has been the subject of
significant litigation and also of legislative amendment. Early cases
decided under the guidelines statute showed that appellate courts were
reluctant to hold that a party was voluntarily unemployed or underem-
ployed if there was no evidence of the unemployed or underemployed
party's bad faith.250 Disturbed that the bad faith standard was an inappropri-
ate burden to place on child support recipients, the General Assembly
246 See Tilley v. Tilley, 947 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that child
support guidelines apply to modification although separation agreement was
entered into before guideline adoption); Leathers v. Ratliff, 925 S.W.2d 197, 200
(Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (applying rule continuing child support for child who remains
in high school after majority).
247 See K.R.S. § 403.212(3). "Gross income" is defined by section 403.212(2)(b),
(c).
248 The child support guidelines establish a minimum support level of $60 per
month for one child even if the obligor has no income. See id. § 403.212. Recently,
inBrashears v. Commonwealth, 944 S.W.2d 873,874-75 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997), the
appellate court required an obligor to provide child support although his sole
income was AFDC drawn for another child.
249 See K.R.S. § 403.212(2)(d); see generally Lewis Becker, Spousal and Child
Support and the "VoluntaryReduction ofIncome "Doctrine, 29 CONN. L. REV. 647
(1997).
250 See Keplinger v. Keplinger, 839 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that the trial court should not have imputed income to wife, who was in
school, absent showing of bad faith); McKinney v. McKinney, 813 S.W.2d 828,
828-29 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a father who suffered repeated layoffs and
call backs was not underemployed when he took a more secure job at a lower
wage).
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amended section 403.212(2)(d) to provide that a court might find a parent
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without finding that the parent
intended to avoid or reduce the amount of child support.
The impact of that amendment is unclear. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that trial courts may continue to take all of the facts and circumstances
surrounding employment or the lack of employment into account in
determining whether a party is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
Most trial courts consider carefully whether a parent is avoiding child
support obligations in favor of other expenditures,251 has a history of
nonpayment, or is engaging in a genuine effort to satisfy his or her
obligations to children. A legislative determination that no bad faith need
be found to impute a higher earning capacity to a parent may not be
sufficient to deter trial courts from considering a wide variety of factors in
deciding whether someone is voluntarily underemployed or unemployed.
Trial courts have also had to determine the role of entitlement
payments in defining gross income under the child support guidelines. The
Kentucky statute defines gross income to include Supplemental Security
Income ("ssr) payments,25 2 but that definition may violate federal
limitations imposed on the payments. Courts from some states have found
that SSI benefits are not income, 53 holding that the federal prohibition on
assignment of the payments precludes a state from treating them as income.
Social Security Disability ("SSD") benefits, unlike SSI entitlements,
represent amounts deducted from the employee's salary. 54 Disability
"' See Stewart v. Madera, 744 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (dis-
cussing the "misplaced priorities" of a non-custodial father in spending more on
recreational vehicle payments and gasoline for motor vehicles than on his four
teenage children).
252 See K.R.S. § 403.212(2)(b). For a general discussion of Supplemental
Security Income ("ssr') benefits see Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990). The
federal statute governing SSI is 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383.
13 Compare Cox v. Cox, 654 N.E.2d 275, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (SSI
recipient without other income cannot be held in contempt for failure to pay child
support); Becker County Human Services v. Peppel, 493 N.W.2d 573,576 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1992) (SSI not treated as income when determining child support
payments); Nicholson v. Gavin, 615 N.Y.S.2d 458, 459 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
(SSI benefits may not be considered in determining obligor's ability to pay child
support); and Tennessee Dep't of Human Services ex rel. Young v. Young, 802
S.W.2d 594, 597 (Tenn. 1990) (federal rule bars treatment of SSI as income); with
Whitmore v. Kenney, 626 A.2d 1180, 1185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (federal rule does
not prevent state from considering SSI).
2S4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 301433 (1994).
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benefits are intended to replace lost income. InMiller v. Miller,5 5 the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky held that an obligor should be credited with SSD
payments made directly to his children. The obligor also requested credit
for the excess difference between the ordered child support and SSD
payments. He asked that the credit be applied to accrued arrearages. The
appellate court directed the trial court to consider the equities in applying
excess amounts to arrearages, but it noted that no excess should be applied
to arrearages accruing before the disabling injury.56
Kentucky's child support guidelines permit few deductions from
parental gross income. A parent is entitled to a deduction from gross
income for amounts paid for health care insurance.25 ' A maintenance
obligor is also entitled to a deduction for pre-existing orders for current
maintenance if actually paid.58 In addition, some parents will be entitled
to deductions for child support payments made to "prior born children."
Kentucky's current rule seems to enshrine a "first-family-first" rule.2 9 The
rule operates to provide a deduction in at least two circumstances. First, a
parent subject to pre-existing court orders for child support may deduct the
ordered amounts from gross income if he or she is actually providing the
I Miller v. Miller, 929 S.W.2d 202 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996). The Court of Appeals
of Kentucky has also held that courts may consider a child's own SSI benefits in
setting child support obligations. See Barker v. Hill, 949 S.W.2d 896, 897-98 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1997).
256 See Miller, 929 S.W.2d at 204-05.
257 See K.R.S. § 403.212(2)(g). Section 403.211(7) requires that a court order
determine which parent has responsibility for health care coverage. The statute
defines health care coverage to include payments for insurance, necessary
deductibles, and also co-payments. In addition, section 403.211(8) mandates that
the court allocate responsibility for extraordinary medical expenses, defined as any
expenses in excess of $100 per child per calendar year, under the same
proportionate rule governing basic child support. Each parent thus pays a
percentage of extraordinary medical expenses determined by the ratio that his or
her gross income bears to total gross income of both parents. Kentucky's statutes
permit parents to provide medical coverage to dependent children beyond the age
of majority under certain circumstances. See id. § 403.212(7). Parents must provide
medical coverage for children who are primarily dependent on them for support
and remain full-time students if the health care insurer permits the coverage and the
child is under twenty-five.
" See id. § 403.212(2)(g). The current statute now makes clear that obligors
are entitled to deductions for pre-existing maintenance orders and also for
maintenance ordered to be paid in the current proceeding.
259 See id. § 403.212(2)(e), (g).
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support and if the support is for children who are older than the children
involved in the proceeding before the court.260 The rule avoids problems
similar to those raised in Marksbeny v. Riley.26 1 In Marksberry, children
from a first familywere entitledto less support than children from a second
family after the father agreed with his second wife on a support amount.
The second family award was then deducted from his gross income to
determine the first wife's rights to child support modification.262 A prior-
born child rule avoids this result. A second aspect of the rule involves
obligors whose children are not the subject of the proceeding but are
legally dependent on the obligor with whom they reside.263 If a legally
dependent child resides with the obligor, the obligor may have a child
support obligation imputed to him or her for that child's support.2"4
Joint custody continues to complicate child support computation. The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky has said that equal physical custody of
children does not necessarily mean that no child support need be ordered.
26 See id. § 403.212(2)(g).
261 Marksberry v. Riley, 889 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
262 See id. at 48.
263 See K.R.S. § 403.212(2)(g).
' See id. § 403.212(2)(e), (g). Section 403.212(g)(4) provides that the amount
imputed is the amount that would result from the application of the guidelines to
prior-born children. The guideline amounts for a second child in the family are not
equivalent to the amounts for one child. For example, an obligor with a total gross
income of $2000 per month owes $350 for one child and $512 for two children.
See id. § 403.212(6). Thus, the first-child amount of $350 is raised only $162 if
there are two children in the family. A court imputing support for a prior-born child
deducts from the obligated parent's income the entire one-child amount, thereby
lowering the gross income available for the second child's benefit. Suppose thatA,
a widower with a minor child, C, marries B. A and B then have a child, D. IfA and
B divorce, A has an obligation imputed to him for the support of C. If A had a
$2000-per-month income and B had no income, A's imputed obligation for C
would be $350. However, A's obligation forD would be set on a gross income of
$1650, so that the obligation would be between $293 and $308 per month. See id.
The A-C household, one adult and one child, would have a total of $1692 (if the
$308 figure were used) and the B-D household would have a total of $308 per
month, assuming B would have no other income. If B had $1000-per-month
income, that income would not be relevant toA's imputed obligation for Cbecause
B has no legal responsibility for C. However, A's obligation for D would be
computed on the basis of his $1650 income added to B's $1000 income, or $2650.
The total child support obligation would be between $424 and $435, and A would
owe 62.26%, or if the $435 figure were used, approximately $270. The rule applies
without regard to the actual ages of C and D or the difference in their ages.
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In Downey v. Rogers,265 the court noted that some parental expenses
continue even when children do not reside in the home, while others are
abated.2" The court also implied that disparity in parental earning capacity
might affect child support awards in joint custody cases.267
Trial courts retain significant discretion to determine appropriate child
support obligations when parents enjoy joint custody. Courts may need
discretion because joint custody can involve a variety of residential
arrangements as well as differences in parental income that would
undermine the joint custody arrangement and detrimentally affect the child
if some payments were not required. Rules permitting deviation from the
child support guidelines grant trial courts substantial discretion to find the
equities in individual situations. Nevertheless, the existence of that
discretion means that joint custody cases are not likely to exhibit the
horizontal equity268 provided elsewhere by the child support guidelines.
Similarly situated families may receive different treatment in the matter of
child support as a result of a trial court's discretion injoint custody cases.
The General Assembly could, of course, adopt a rule that would apply to
all joint custody cases, restoring horizontal equity, but it seems unlikely
that appellate courts will craft a such a rule.
VI. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR CHILDREN,
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS, AND ADOPTION
The General Assembly has buttressed protection against family
violence by passing state statutes269 implementing the federal Violence
Against Women ActY.27 The Kentucky statutes govern enforcement of
foreign protective orders,271 which must be given full faith and credit.272
They also provide for certification of Kentucky orders to facilitate
265Downey v. Rogers, 847 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993). More recently, the
Court of Appeals of Kentucky has held that an obligor with primary residential
custody need not make offsetting payments to a former spouse for the portion of
time that the children spent with her. See Brown v. Brown, 952 S.W.2d 707, 708
(Ky. Ct. App. 1997). Brown did not involve high-income parties. See id.266 See Downey, 847 S.W.2d at 64.
267 See id.
261 "Horizontal equity" means that obligors with the same income pay the same
amount of child support.
269 See K.R.S. §§ 403.751-.784.
27 0 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902.
271 See K.R.S. § 403.7521.
272 See 18 U.S.C. § 2265.
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enforcement of those orders by other states.7 3 Other recent amendments to
Kentucky statutes prohibit the publication of a domestic violence victim's
or minor child's address in documents issued in connection with emer-
gency protective orders and made available to the public.274 Other statutory
changes also require courts considering child custody to take allegations of
domestic violence into account in making a custody determination.275
Increased emphasis on child safety as a primary goal ofchildprotective
services may develop from activities of the 1998 General Assembly.
276
Both nationally and in Kentucky, child advocates have called for strength-
ening protective agencies' right to remove at-risk children from homes as
well as decreasing the time that children spend in foster care before a
decision is made on an appropriate permanent placement.277 The focus on
child safety may result in significant changes in dependency and neglect
law, as well as agency interpretation of the reasonable efforts required prior
to moving for termination of parental rights.278 Pilot projects across the
273 See K.R.S. § 403.75 1.
274 See id. § 403.770(1).
275 See id. § 403.270(2).
276 After this Article was completed, the Kentucky General Assembly passed
House Bill 142, which made numerous changes to the Kentucky UAified Juvenile
Code. These changes were designed to emphasize protection of children. See id. §
600.010 (adding protection of children to the policy statement of the Kentucky
Unified Juvenile Code). Among the more significant changes are amendments to
section 625.090, the termination-of-parental-rights statute, to permit termination
if a parent has been convicted of a felony that involved the infliction of serious
physical injury to the child, id. § 625.090(2)(d), or has had parental rights to a
previously born child terminated involuntarily, id. § 625.090(2)(h).
27 See Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vs. Children's Interests: The Case of
the Foster Child, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371 (1996).
278 The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (1997), requires states to continue reasonable efforts to reunify families, but
also provides that no reunification efforts need be made if the child has been
subject to aggravated circumstances, a parent has assaulted or killed another child,
or a parent's rights to a sibling have been involuntarily terminated. See id. § 101.
Kentucky statutes require that courts consider whether a child may be reasonably
protected by alternative means less restrictive than removal. See K.R.S. § 620.130.
In addition, section 625.090(2)(c) requires a court terminating parental rights to
determine whether the Cabinet for Families and Children has rendered or attempted
to render all reasonable services. See Debra Ratterman Baker, Reducing Delays
Created By Reasonable/Diligent Efforts Requirement in Termination Grounds, 14
A.B.A. JUv. & CHILD WELFARE L. REP. 124 (Oct. 1995). For two views on the
efficacy and appropriateness of state reasonable efforts requirements, compare
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state may address the negative impact of foster care on very young
children. In addition, efforts to reduce judicial delay in termination of
parental rights cases and increased judicial attention to permanency
planning for children will play a significant role in protecting at-risk
children.
The extent to which the termination process may be altered to provide
increased protection for children will depend not only on changes in
process made at the trial court level, but also on appellate court interpreta-
tion of this state's statutory grounds for termination.279 Section 625.090
provides that a circuit court may not order termination of parental rights
unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence, a constitutionally required
standard,280 that one or more of the statutory grounds for termination have
been met. When a parent's actions or failure to act severely harms a child,
the statutory standards are not often the subject of judicial debate.
However, appellate court attitudes to long-term inadequate parenting are
less clear. Kentucky courts have focused on parental rights in termination
cases, but they have not discussed limitations that states may impose on
those rights when parental behavior is harmful because of its persistent or
chronic nature.
Arguably, Kentucky's statutes currently provide the necessary basis for
terminating the parental rights of parents whose poor parenting is not likely
to be remedied by further social services and whose chronic failures signal
a dismal future for their children. If a parent has failed to provide essential
care and protection for a child for a period not less than six months, section
625.090(1)(d) permits a court to terminate parental rights after proof that
there is no reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and
protection, considering the age of the child. Appellate courts might find in
David J. Herring, Inclusion ofthe Reasonable Efforts Requirements in Termination
ofParental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Childfor the Failures ofthe State Child
Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 139 (1992) with Patrick R. Tamilia, A
Response to Elimination of the Reasonable Efforts Required Prior to Termination
of Parental Rights Status, 54 U. PIr. L. REV. 211(1992).
279 Recent federal legislation provides significant incentives for states to define
clearly some circumstances in which child safety is the paramount concern. See
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115,
§ 101. For a discussion of the legislation, see Miriam Rollin, Legislative Update:
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of1997, 16 A.B.A. CHILD L. PRAC. 166 (Jan.
1998).
280 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding due process
requires a "clear and convincing evidence" standard to completely and irrevocably
sever the rights of parents to a natural child).
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this standard a direction that parents of very young children, if provided
with intensive social services designed to improve parenting skills, may
lose parental rights if they fail to show improvement in parenting skills.
The six-month period might be read not merely as a minimum grace period
afforded to the parent, but as a legislative determination of an appropriate
time span for agency efforts directed at young children.281
Assuring safe, permanent homes for all of Kentucky's children remains
a challenge for Kentucky courts and social service agencies. Over the last
ten years, the General Assembly has strengthened Kentucky's adoption
laws, removing some of the problems with private adoptions and attempt-
ing to insure that child placement is not disrupted by revocation of consent
to adoption.282 While these changes in adoption laws protect both biological
and prospective adoptive parents, 283 the primary reason for reforming
adoption law is to assure the welfare of the involved children. Providing
permanency for all Kentucky children will require attention not only to
privately litigated adoption cases, but to public programs promoting
adoption and supporting adoptive families.
2' Cf CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5 (West Supp. 1998) (identifying in-
stances in which no reunification efforts need be made). An example of
California's rule is that state's omission of reunification services if a parent has
been convicted of causing another minor's death. See id.; see also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-1-102(1.6) (1997) (providing for expedited termination of parental
rights and permanent placement of children under six years of age).
2 For an overview of Kentucky's private adoption laws, see Mitchell A.
Charney & Mary A. Maple, Private Adoption in Kentucky, UK/CLE Publications
(1994). See also generally 16 GRAHAM & KELLER, supra note 9, at 319-39.
" Some problems related to the rights of unwed fathers remain. Section
625.065 limits the rights of unwed fathers to participate in adoption proceedings,
but those limitations leave significant opportunities for some unwed fathers. For
example, section 625.065(1)(d) requires only that the father commence ajudicial
proceeding claiming parental rights. No time limit is stated in this section, unlike
section 625.065(1)(b), which requires action to be taken within sixty days after the
child's birth. Cases that demonstrate the long-term problems caused when a
putative father is not appropriately before the court are Whittington v. Cunnagin
ex rel. Englert, 925 S.W.2d 455 (Ky. 1996); Unknown Person ex rel. Englert v.
Whittington, 737 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1987).
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